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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines three surprise victories for workers' rights in the Guatemalan
garment sector. In the past three years, three unions have formed at the Choishin,
Cimatextiles, and Nobland factories and each has negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement. This thesis explores why these victories were possible given the general
context of globalization and the economic and institutional context of Guatemala.
I have proposed a model that describes the dynamic approach that allowed the unions
to form and negotiate the only collective bargaining agreements in Guatemala's
apparel-for-export sector. These unions were successful because cross-border union
organizing, corporate codes of conduct, independent monitoring, and government
enforcement were dynamically combined. This thesis also demonstrates how the new
synthesized model accounts for differences across the three cases.
These cases provide a series of Lessons for protecting workers' rights. But the most
salient lesson from Guatemala is that, under certain conditions, victory for Labor
rights is possible; it is possible to maintain garment sector employment while
increasing respect for workers' rights. And if this sort of victory is possible in
Guatemala, then it seems possible anywhere.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard M. Locke
Title: Alvin J. Siteman Professor of Entrepreneurship and Political Science
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The unexpected has occurred in Guatemala.
Given the realities of globalization and Guatemala's history of brutal repression
against unions, workers in Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector faced seemingly
insurmountable challenges in organizing themselves to improve their working
conditions. And yet, in the past three years, three unions have formed in
Guatemala's garment factories and negotiated the only collective bargaining
agreements in the country's sector.
Furthermore, given the ongoing and heated debate that pits unions and corporate
codes of conduct against one another as the better way of respecting workers' rights,
we would not expect that the two systems could coexist. And yet, workers were able
to organize the first two unions in the Guatemalan garment sector at the Choishin and
Cimatextiles (Choi/Cima) factories, where Liz Claiborne's corporate code of conduct
was being actively monitored. In fact, Liz Claiborne (LCI) was the first apparel
retailer in the world to implement a long-term independent monitoring program.
Finally, given its history of brutal repression of trade unions and diminished state
capacity after thirty-six years of civil war, we wouldn't expect that the Guatemalan
government would be willing or able to enforce the national labor code. And yet, the
Guatemalan government intervened in a significant way in these three cases to bring
about the direct negotiation of the collective bargaining agreements.
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As I will describe in the next chapter (Chapter 2), these three Guatemalan cases are
surprising given the general terms of the debate about how to protect workers' rights
in the developing world (Section 2.1), and given the specific economic and
institutional environment in Guatemala (Section 2.2). In essence, the terms of the
debate on Labor rights have established that:
* In the current global economic and institutional context it is nearly impossible for
unions to form in apparel factories.'
* Corporate codes of conduct and unions are incompatible means of protecting
workers' rights.2
* Government intervention to enforce labor regulations is highly unlikely.3
Furthermore, Guatemala is an especially tough case for labor organizing because:
* Multinational corporations (MNCs) have come to exploit cheap labor, high quotas,
low tariffs, and proximity to US markets.4
* The Guatemalan government has little enforcement capacity after thirty-six years
of civil war.5
· There is a history of brutal repression of trade unions in the country.6
1 See Arthurs (2001), Collins (2003), Esbenshade (2001), and Nadvi Et Waltring (2002).
2 Personal communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. January 14 and February 3, 2004.
Also see Compa (2001), Justice (2001), and Kearney (2003).
3 See Arthurs (2001), Collins (2003), Esbenshade (2001), and Nadvi E Waltring (2002).
4 See Barrie (2004), COVERCO (1999), and Varley (1998).
5 See Frundt (1998), Jonas (2000), MINUGUA (2000 and 2003), and Varley (1998).
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And yet, today, three unions and three collective bargaining agreements exist in
Guatemala's garment sector. The gains of the first two unions, Choishin and
Cimatextiles, were billed as a victory, a limited victory, but a victory nonetheless.
The third union at Nobland, however, was a much more forceful victory. In contrast
to the Choi/Cima unions, the Nobland union achieved a membership rate of nearly
fifty percent of factory workers, reached contract negotiations in record time, and
finalized their collective bargaining agreement in the spring of 2004.
This thesis will explore the factors that allowed these successes against the odds,
given the reality of the current economic and institutional context in the world in
general and in Guatemala specifically. It will ask whether the victories can be
explained by the various models for protecting workers' rights or if can we learn some
new essons for respecting labor rights. It will consider whether we can synthesize a
model for a strategy that goes beyond the terms of the current debate. And finally, it
will cull a series of Lessons that might provide insight for protecting workers' rights in
other countries.
1.1: Methodology
The research for this project was conducted in the Guatemala City metropolitan area
in January and March 2004. Initial conversations with the Maquila Solidarity Center in
Canada pointed me to the Choishin and Cimatextiles factories as potential case
studies. I then spent the month of January in Guatemala City, where I interviewed
union leaders, external union organizers, factory management, representatives of Liz
6 See Frundt (1998), Goldston (1989), MINUGUA (2000 and 2003), and Varley (1999).
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Claiborne, government officials, labor inspectors, and independent monitors
associated with the Choi/Cima case (see Appendix A for a List of interviews). I was
also fortunate enough to visit the Choishin factory during a work day, and on another
day, observe a Cimatextiles union committee meeting.
Through the Ministry of Labor, I was also able to gain access to almost three years
worth of official government filings on the case. These documents could then be
compared with the details gleaned from interviews and from public independent
monitoring reports. Using all of these sources, I compared the story of the formation
of the unions from all perspectives, trying to triangulate an objective explanation of
each case.
As I explored the history of the Choi/Cima unions (SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA), I heard
of the newly formed Nobland union (SITRANB). In January, I was able to learn enough
about this case to become very interested, so I decided to return to Guatemala in
March to explore this second case further. I was once again able to interview union
leaders, external union organizers, government officials, abor inspectors, and
independent monitors associated with the Nobland case (see Appendix A for a list of
interviews); however, despite repeated attempts, I was unable to interview the
factory management or the MNCs that source with the factory.
Nonetheless, the March trip was important for the exploration of the government's
role in the three cases. The new Ministry of Labor officials were unavailable in
14
January, but quite available and interested in speaking with me in March.
Furthermore, the Nobtand case had progressed further by the time I returned in
March; the SITRANB union and management were in negotiations and a collective
bargaining agreement was in sight. While my investigation of the Choi/Cima case was
more historical, I was able to Learn about the Nobland case as it developed and talk to
the actors as they made key decisions.
Because I spent a total of six weeks in Guatemala over the course of two visits, I was
able to interview the same individuals on multiple occasions and press for greater
detail as my understanding of the cases developed. I was also able to trace changes
within the factories, unions, and campaigns over time. However, I did face
difficulties in gaining access to all actors, particularly the NobLand management.
Furthermore, I must be cautious in interpreting my interviews. Because of the high
stakes of the campaigns and negotiations, i.e. potential loss of reputation or business
for the MNCs and local factories, and physical dangers for the workers and unions, it is
possible that all the parties were not able to speak freely with me about the cases.
However, I am confident that the triangulation methods I used allowed me to get to
the heart of these stories.
1.2: What This Research Does Not Undertake
This thesis does not try to demonstrate that one approach is conclusively more
effective in improving working conditions in the developing world. Given the scope of
my research, the amount of time available, and the level of access granted to me by
companies, that sort of conclusion would not be possible. While it might be
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interesting to demonstrate that unions do indeed improve working conditions, I was
not able to conduct my own inspections of the factories, a step that would be
required to reach such a conclusion. Furthermore, while the presence of the union
and collective bargaining agreement at Choishin and Cimatextiles appears on the
surface to have improved working conditions, not enough time has passed since the
signing of the Nobland agreement to assess changes in its conditions.
Instead, this thesis addresses the ways in which strategies can be combined to protect
workers' rights in the developing world. These rights have been established by the
International Labor Organization (ILO), a group created by the international
community to define international labor standards. The ILO Core Labor standards
include two conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining.7 The
group of core labor standards have been ratified and incorporated into the labor
codes of at Least 120 nations, including Guatemala.8
Historically speaking, independent trade unions and contracts have been the
demonstrated means of allowing workers to protect their own right vis-a-vis the
power of management. Jane Collins, Professor of Sociology at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison explains that "advances such as the forty-hour week, the
minimum wage, and health and safety rules did not simply evolve in the industrialized
nations, and they were not the result of the Largesse of industry leaders. They
7 Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and
Collective Bargaining. The other ILO core conventions cover forced abor, child employment, fair
wages, and nondiscrimination. ILO (2004).
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resulted from workers' protest and national dialogue about what was right and fair." 9
For example, in the early 20th century, labor stability was achieved in the US garment
sector through union bargaining of a collective contract. Andrew Ross, Professor and
Director of American Studies at New York University, argues that this is where the
prototype of the collective bargaining agreement emerged.' °
However, this thesis measures the successful protection of workers' rights by more
than just the presence of a union. I define success as the unions' ability to make
demands on management and negotiate labor benefits. Success is not just
compliance with minimum labor rights, but also the ability of the unionized workers
to attain negotiation that will allow them to improve their benefits above those
required by law. In this definition of success, the formation of a union becomes one
of a series of factors that allows for protection of workers' rights, the ultimate goal.
1.3: Preview of Findings
In 2003, the Choishin and Cimatextiles unions attained partial success. The unions
negotiated the only collective bargaining agreements in the Guatemalan garment
sector at the time. However, this should be considered a limited success, according
to my definition, because although they now have institutions in place to protect
workers' rights, they still have limited leverage vis-A-vis management to improve
their working conditions. They have limited Leverage because the collective
bargaining agreement was required by the government to improve GuatemaLa's
17
8 This accounts for seventy percent of the ILO's membership. Only seventy-seven members have
ratified the Core Convention on Child Labor (No. 138). Bates (2000).
international trade image and not because the union could demand it egally.
However, the partial victory thesis is supported anecdotally by improved working
conditions in the factories.
In the NobLand case, I witnessed a more complete success for protection of workers'
rights. The NobLand union is powerful both in terms of numbers and bargaining
ability. It negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in record time and engaged
the government productively in the process. The workers attained negotiation that
allowed them to improve their conditions above those required by law, i.e. they
gained permission for time off to care for sick children, permission for medical leave,
fairer treatment, cleaner bathrooms, and childcare.
As described above, these successes are surprising given the reality of the current
economic and institutional context in the world in general and in Guatemala
specifically. This thesis, therefore, provides a multifaceted explanation of the factors
that allowed for successes against the odds. In brief, these unions were successful
because cross-border union organizing, corporate codes of conduct, independent
monitoring, and government enforcement were dynamically combined. These cases
were dynamic because they included the workers as active participants in the
protection of their rights; did not rely entirely on corporate codes of conduct and
pressure on the local factory from the MNC; did not give up on the possibility that the
government can enforce local labor laws; and acknowledged that independent
9 Collins (2001): 187.
18
monitoring, unions, and government enforcement can be combined for positive
results.
First of all, the presence of the union was the essential building block of the
campaign and demonstrated respect for freedom of association. The unions used
conflict sparingly and only as necessary to attain collective bargaining negotiations.
They developed new strategies to target both the MNC and the Ministry of Labor. The
support they received from their international allies was also essential for opening the
space in which they could maneuver.
Second, the engagement of the government was achieved through coordination
national and international pressure and was essential for the protection of the rights
to freedom of association and collective bargaining. This engagement was attained
by leveraging international trade pressures. Finally, the provision of trustworthy
information by an international monitor was essential to engaging the multinational
buyers and convincing them not to cut production and leave Guatemala.
These cases provide a series of lessons for protecting workers' rights, including that
transnational advocacy strategies are essential for opening spaces for local action;
that coordinated national and international pressures can motivate the national
government to get involved in labor rights; that independent verification by a trusted
source can be an important key for gaining respect for unions; and that conflict
10 Ross (1997).
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should be used as a means of attaining collective bargaining and then be held in
reserve as a threat.
1.4: Overview of Chapters
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the three case studies by describing the general terms of
the debate on protecting workers' rights in the developing world (Section 2.1) and the
specific economic and institutional environment in Guatemala (Section 2.2).
Chapter 3 provides a complete overview of the Choi/Cima and Nobland cases. This
description of the case studies will allow the reader to understand how a union
formed in each factory, how each union arrived at collective bargaining agreements,
how independent monitoring was carried out at each factory, and how the
Guatemalan government participated in each case. These descriptions will also allow
the reader to understand the similarities and differences across the cases.
After establishing this foundation, I explore whether the successes can be explained
by the various existing models for protecting workers' rights (Chapter 4). I
demonstrate that each body of literature relating to improving labor conditions (i.e.
lobby government to enforce labor laws, implement corporate codes of conduct and
independent monitoring, and organize cross border union campaigns) is individually
inadequate to explain the occurrences in Guatemala's apparel sector.
After demonstrating the limitations of these explanations, I synthesize a model for a
combination strategy that goes beyond the terms of the current debate. This model
20
__ _
combines the three strategies for protecting workers' rights: (1) government
enforcement, (2) union organizing, and (3) corporate codes of conduct/independent
monitoring. The goal of the approach is to gain respect for freedom of association
and collective bargaining without allowing the factory owners or multinational buyers
to cut production and leave the country. The multidimensional approach provides an
organized local worker presence in the factory, but aso focuses local and
international pressure through the MNC and government to squeeze the local factory.
In this model, corporate codes of conduct are an important source of leverage on the
MNCs, and independent monitoring is used to corroborate reports from workers,
unions, and their international allies and supply trustworthy information to the MNCs.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I flesh out the cases to demonstrate in detail how each of
aforementioned surprise victories can be best explained by this new model. I also
demonstrate factually that the differences across the cases can be best explained
using this model. Specifically, Chapter 6 demonstrates that the Nobland union used
the same model as the Choi/Cima unions, but was more successful because it was
able to avoid much of the conflict that ensued in the first two cases. I argue that
there was ess conflict because the unions' allies had Learned significant lessons from
the previous cases; the target actors had learned what to expect from the union and
its allies and therefore responded to the threat of the model; and the workers at the
Nobland factory had an organizing background and a community behind them.
21
In conclusion (Chapter 7), this thesis proposes new lessons for respecting abor rights
that might provide insight for factories in other countries. If these labor rights
successes were possible in the unlikely Guatemalan context, then these cases provide
hope for protecting workers' rights in the garment sector across the globe.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The 1990s saw the dawning of popular resistance to unchecked market liberalization
and corporate globalization as MNCs began to relocate their production facilities
overseas in search of the lowest wages. A group of activists and academics have
argued that as barriers to trade have been eliminated throughout the world and
markets have been liberalized in recent decades, global capital has been freed from
the traditional regulatory constraints of the nation state. " This group makes a case
that the restructuring of production and distribution networks, trade liberalization at
the global and regional levels, and deregulation policies of governments have created
a situation in which "southern firms are locked into a downward spiral of competition
based on lowering wages and flouting of labor and environmental standards," i.e. a
race to the bottom.12
However, this matter is far from decided. In fact, the questions of which groups
benefit and lose from globalization and how globalization has affected the conditions
of labor in the developing world are open to vigorous debate.
2.1: The Context of the Debate
This section will examine this debate by considering the following questions: What
has globalization meant for the garment sector in the developing world? Who has
gained and lost from these changes? Once we have laid out the terms of these
" For example, Strange (1996) and Schmidt (1995).
12 Nadvi & Waltring (2002): 4 and Jeffcott E Yanz (1999).
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discussions, we will focus on the topic of how to protect workers' rights in the
developing world.
Who Benefits and Who Loses from Globalization?
In the era of economic globalization, MNCs have disintegrated the traditionally
vertical supply chains, maintaining control of design and marketing operations in the
industrialized countries while outsourcing more labor-intensive production facilities to
the developing world.13 A company like Liz Caiborne (LCI), for example, now
functions within a global apparel supply chain network and no longer directly employs
the workers who produce the clothing that bears the LCI label.
A group of academics and activists have argued that these transformations have
created a race to the bottom, and they point to three fundamental changes to the
global economic system: (1) Trade liberalization at the global and regional levels:
The international trade policies of the World Trade Organization have limited national
governments' ability to regulate trade based on social or environmental standards; (2)
Deregulation policies of governments: the neo-liberal project to construct a free-
market economy has encouraged national governments to decrease regulation and
give corporations more leeway with respect to pollution and wages; and (3) The
convergence of globalization and restructuring of production and distribution
networks: As trade restrictions have lifted and global supply chains have lengthened,
competition has increased between countries to attract foreign direct investment. In
24
13 Gereffi, Spener, and Bair (2002).
- -- -- -- 
conjunction with WTO policies, this competition has encouraged nations to ower
their environmental and labor regulations, thereby feeding the race to the bottom.14
Within the globalization debate, two kinds of arguments have been advanced in
opposition to these race-to-the-bottom claims. The first set of arguments holds that
globalization does not weaken state protections. For example, Dani Rodrik has
demonstrated a correlation between openness to trade and size of government.'5 His
study seems to contradict the belief that globalization and free trade have made
countries more vulnerable to the whims of the market.
The second set of arguments against the race to the bottom is that free trade is good
for lesser-developed countries because it brings jobs and development. Free-trade
economists argue that unrestricted trade benefits workers in the developing world by
increasing exports and therefore jobs. From this perspective, any job is better than
no job and industries such as the apparel sector are as rungs on the ladder of
development.1 6 This type of development allows a developing country to benefit from
its comparative advantage in cheap and plentiful labor.17 This view also proposes that
protection of labor rights will naturally improve over time. Furthermore, these free
trade proponents reject the claim that countries compete by lowering environmental
and labor standards. Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati 8, for example, cites evidence that
14 Jeffcott and Yanz (1999), O'Rourke 2003, and Schmidt (1995).
5 Rodrik (1998).
16 Bhagwati (1995). Also see Paul Krugman, Daniel Griswold, and Jeffrey Sachs.
17 Collins (2003).
18 Dr. Bhagwati is a Professor at Columbia University and Senior Fellow in International Economics at
the Council on Foreign Relations. He was Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General, GATT and
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corporations do not make locational decisions based on the level of environmental
standards.
Dr. Bhagwati also rejects demands for universal labor standards on the grounds that
they are protectionist, i.e. proposed by richer countries trying to protect themselves
from those developing countries with comparative advantage in low-wage, unskilled
labor. He contends that the campaigns of moralistic activists from the global North to
implement paternalistic protections will rob the developing world of essential jobs
that are better paying than most domestic employment.19
A third perspective in the debate argues that both the 'globophobe' and 'globophile'
arguments simplify the complex conditions that workers in the developing world face.
For example, academics like Nadvi Thoburn have demonstrated that not all
countries have competed in the global economy by lowering standards.20 From their
perspective, therefore, the real question is not whether labor standards are
inherently protectionist or whether they automatically lead to industrial upgrading,
but rather, under what conditions does compliance with standards lead to such
upgrading? Nadvi gives us the example of Pakistan where compliance with child-labor
standards led to upgrading of the soccer-ball manufacturing sector. In this case, the
collective implementation of standards improved the competitive position of local
soccer-ball producers.
also served as Special Adviser to the UN on Globalization and External Adviser to the Director General
of the WTO.
19 Bhagwati (1995).
20 Nadvi Thoburn (2003).
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The US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement case also demonstrates that
garment firms and garment workers in both the developed and developing worlds can
benefit simultaneously from trade under certain conditions. Because this trade
agreement linked increased access to US textile markets for its exports to increased
protection of labor rights, Cambodia could economically profit from protection of
workers' rights. As Professor Regina Abrami of Harvard Business School points out,
this case demonstrated that the "protection of workers' rights did not come at the
price of economic development." 21
Along similar lines, the non-governmental organization Oxfam International has
argued that free trade does not have to be detrimental to the developing world. It
contends that while free trade is essential for development, the trade rules are rigged
against the developing world.22 Therefore, Oxfam proposes that the world trade
system be reformed so that the developing world can gain from trade on more equal
footing, and so that the rights of workers in these countries can be protected. When
these workers are allowed to speak for themselves, they emphasize the economic
importance of access to global markets, but also express alarm at the conditions in
which they work; as Bangladeshi sewing-machine operator, Nawaz Hazari, explains:
In my village we were very poor. I came here to find a better life.
Today I have more money. My job here means that I can give my
children an education, and we are not hungry. They will have the
chance of a better home. But work in the factory is hard. We are not
well treated. And if we become sick, we have no protection. Do people
in your country think about our condition when they buy the shirts we
make?2 3
21 Abrami (2003).
22 Oxfam (2002).
23 As quoted in Oxfam (2002).
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How Do We Protect Workers' Rights?
How, therefore, does one improve the position of workers in the developing world
given the current political and economic constraints imposed by economic
globalization? How is it possible to give workers the option to
continue working in export factories, together with the assurance that
this employment will take place in a situation which defends their
dignity, ensures appropriate remuneration, avoids arbitrary and
inhumane treatment, guarantees freedom of association and collective
bargaining and protects them from harm, in terms of both violence and
harassment at work and unhealthy working conditions and processes?24
It's a tall order, but an important task. How can a developing nation keep jobs, but
make them better jobs?
This thesis is framed in the context of a heated debate about which strategies and
mechanisms are most appropriate for guaranteeing the protection of workers' rights
among unskilled Laborers in developing countries. Various models have been proposed
with supporters of each mechanism extolling the advantages of that model over other
means. None, however, has demonstrated conclusively which mechanism is most
effective. Rather, they have created a vigorous debate about how to protect
workers' rights in an increasingly liberalized global economy.
The debate reveals a negotiation among three approaches to protecting labor rights in
the developing world: (1) building state capacity for regulation, monitoring, and
enforcement of national labor codes, (2) non-governmental regulation, such as
28
24 Pearson and Seyfang (2002): 44.
corporate codes of conduct, enforced through independent monitoring, and (3)
workers organizing to form independent trade unions.25 The following subsections will
summarize the strengths and limitations of each of these approaches in turn.
Building State Capacity
Those who believe that corporate globalization is leading to a race to the bottom see
little potential for national governments to regulate, monitor, or enforce national
labor laws in the current global economy. For example, Harry Arthurs (Professor of
Law President Emeritus, York University, Toronto, Canada) explains that
globalization has moved much labor regulation beyond the scope of national
governments because it "has weakened the political legitimacy and practical effect of
national labor law, and has inhibited, rather than promoted, the development of new
labor law systems that might respond to the realities of transnational economic
activity. "26
However, as a challenge to this belief, Professor Regina Abrami of Harvard Business
School (as described above) has demonstrated that state capacity to protect workers'
rights can indeed be built under certain conditions.27 Her case study on the US-
Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement showed that if such an arrangement can
be achieved in a country as devastated as Cambodia, then there is hope for other
countries. Professor Abrami argues that Cambodia was able to attain this type of
scenario because market access was linked to labor rights and an ILO monitoring
29
25 Esbenshade (2001).
26 Arthurs (2001): 284.
arrangement was in place. In this case, regulation of labor standards through trade
was not a means of protectionism, but rather a way to allow Cambodia to upgrade its
garment sector while increasing the national government capacity for protecting
workers' rights.2 8
Corporate Codes of Conduct
In response to the perceived decreasing effectiveness of national labor law and race
to the bottom, non-governmental systems of labor regulation have emerged, taking
the form of corporate codes of conduct, production guidelines, monitoring standards,
certification bodies, and seals of approval.29 For example, two well-known
certification bodies have been formed for the international garment sector, the Fair
Labor Association (FLA) and the Workers' Rights Consortium (WRC).
These monitoring and certification arrangements have emerged out of the concerns
that current national regulations are not working and that enforcement is not likely to
improve given the current global economic context.30 As part of this shift, the social
accountability contract of corporate codes of conduct and monitoring has replaced
the traditional social contract between workers, management, and government.31
The imbalance of power between the three strategies of combating sweatshops-
(1) government enforcement, (2) worker organizing, and (3) corporate codes of
conduct-has led toward the predominance of codes of conduct and monitoring;
27 Abrami (2003).
28 Ibid.
29 Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser (2001), Nadvi Et Waltring (2002), and O'Rourke (2003). Similar
systems have also emerged in the fair trade and forest product sectors.
Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser (2001): 56-57.
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"Enforcement, which relies on the power of Local government, and organizing, which
depend on the power of workers, are both floundering while corporate campaigns and
monitoring, which rely on publicity and consumer/investor power, is on the
upsurge..... "32
Given the international institutional context described above, the advantage of a
code of conduct ies in the fact that corporations are held to the same standards in all
countries and that labor activists are able to demand accountability from the
international brand name buyers that don't technically employ the workers.33 The
key aspect of corporate codes of conduct, in particular, is that they commit
international brand-name buyers to monitoring their entire supply chain and verifying
that all clothes that bear their Label have been produced under humane and ethical
conditions.
These non-governmental regulations have gained support from non governmental
organizations (NGOs) that have traditionally been wary of market mechanisms and
privatized regulation. These advocates for workers' rights began to ook towards
certification and monitoring systems after they had been frustrated by multiple failed
attempts to get national governments to regulate labor conditions or create universal
regulation on the international Level. From their perspective, given the realities of
3' Esbenshade (2002).
32 Esbenshade (2002): 112
33 Jeffcott and Yanz (1999).
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today's global economy and institutional context, non-governmental regulation is an
appealing supplement to government regulation.34
On the other hand, some critics see codes of conduct as inherently supporting the
withdrawal of government from labor enforcement. They fear that corporate codes
of conduct will supersede the roles of states and international organizations in
regulating corporations in an era of globalization. 3 5 Furthermore, they question if
civil society advocates aren't just the "useful idiots of globalization."3 6 For example,
voluntary certification initiatives may actually serve as a substitute for statutory
national regulation and therefore legitimize the absence of national enforcement.37
This would be possible if corporate codes of conduct and independent certification
allow corporations to avoid a "nightmarish scenario of stringent and often
contradictory regulations in country after country" or to preempt the development of
enforceable international labor laws.38
As such, these critics see codes of conduct as nothing more than a public relations
tool used to trick consumers into thinking that companies are socially responsible.
Neil Kearney, President of the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers'
Federation (ITGLWF), emphasizes that while some codes are good, "the vast majority
are not worth the paper they are written on....A great many of these are general in
34 O'Rourke (2003): 3-4, 7.
35 Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser (2001).
36 Rieff (1999).
37 Jenkins, Pearson Et Seyfang (2002).
38 Gereffi, Garcia E Sasser (2001): 59.
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nature and meaningless in practice, in reality a public relations exercise and very
frequently a fig leaf for continued exploitation."39
The most vocal critics believe that codes of conduct are implemented by companies in
an effort to prevent workers from joining trade unions.40 For example, many trade
unions suspect that corporate codes of conduct and independent NGO monitoring are
part of an agenda which intends to undermine the organizing and bargaining roles of
trade unions.4 1
Professor Jill Esbenshade of San Diego State University voices the major critique of
codes of conduct-that this new accountability contract does not "actively engage
these workers in any participatory defense of their rights."42 Along similar ines,
Dwight Justice of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) points
out that "codes of conduct are not as efficient as what workers can do for themselves
where they are permitted to join free trade unions and to bargain collectively with
their employer in the knowledge that their rights are secure and protected."43
Furthermore, codes of conduct make workers objects of regulation rather than
political subjects or partners in determining what conditions are most important and
what requirements are appropriate. Because codes often do not prioritize the aspects
39 Kearney (2003).
40 Compa (2001), Justice (2001), and Kearney (2003).
41 Compa (2001).
42 Esbenshade (2001).
43 Justice (2001).
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of the work environment that are most important to workers and because codes are
limited to branded industries, workers see codes as the second best option.44
Neil Kearney summarizes the criticisms when he says that corporate codes of conduct
"can not substitute for good law or social dialogue....they can not replace sustainable
protection for working people and their families. They can not replace either the duty
of governments to protect their citizens through the enforcement of good law that
complies with the ILO standards, nor the sustainable protection that flows from social
dialogue between employers and trade unions." 45
Cross-Border Organizing
Union organizers who, like Kearney, criticize the intentions and methods behind
corporate codes of conduct and independent monitoring, propose instead a model of
cross-border organizing that protects workers' rights while also giving them a voice.
Mark Anner, former coordinator of the EL Salvador Independent Monitoring Group
(GIMES) and current PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Cornell
University, explains that "Labor in globalized production regimes is beginning to
pursue its demands in innovative ways by developing ties to new allies both within
and across countries." 46 This innovation has developed a cross-border organizing
model that simultaneously targets the point of production in one country and the
point of consumption in another. Through this model, workers and unions hope to
negotiate for themselves while ensuring that MNCs do not cut and run.
44 Jenkins, Pearson, and Seyfang (2002).
45 Kearney (2003).
46 Anner (2000): 239.
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Anner frames the cross-border organizing modeL in relation to a triangle of power (see
Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-147
Unions and NGO Strategy for Organizing t Improving Conditions
in Garment Assembly Plants
Transnational Campaigns -
Organizing - a
(New Methods)
Multinational
Corporations
Local
Factories
The three points of the triangle are (1) the muLtinationaL buyers, (2) the ocal factory
management, and (3) the ocal government. The strategy targets the three points of
the triangle simultaneously through (1) transnational corporate campaigns, (2) new
methods of organizing, and (3) better aws and enforcement. It uses international
consumer and investor pressure to create space for successful local union organizing
and ocal government abor law enforcement.
The focus of Anner's work is the development of national and international allies and
the use of norms that resonate in the US to create consumer pressure. In other
35
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words, he documents the strategies that engage with the first point of the triangle,
the brand name corporation. He briefly mentions the strategies for targeting the
second point of the triangle-unions are using new methods of organizing-and the
third point of the triangle-local unions and NGOs are pressuring their governments to
improve or enforce labor laws.
This model has several strengths, namely that it describes the leverage points in the
global garment industry and highlights the importance of the multidimensional
pressure applied on key actors. Furthermore, it explains the significant support that
unions receive from their international allies, it includes government as an actor, and
it documents the new organizing methods used by ocal unions.
Henry Frundt48 bolsters Anner's triangle of power, cross-border organizing argument,
explaining that successful cross-border unionization requires the combination of
effective local organizing and transnational activists.49 While Anner focuses on the
use of international allies, Frundt emphasizes how new organizing tactics which
combine legal strategies and on-the-ground action have been successful in the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras. Both Frundt and Armbruster-
Sandoval50 describe how the Phillips-Van Heusen organizing campaign in Guatemala in
the 1990s demonstrated the benefits of cross-border labor cooperation, international
solidarity, trade pressure, and the combination of on-the-ground worker struggle and
48 Dr. Frundt is a Professor of SocioLogy at Ramapo CoLLege of New Jersey, an expert on Central
America, and the author of a book on GuatemaLan labor conditions.
49 Frundt (1999).
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international action.51 They also provide evidence for new Local organizing strategies
that gain direct negotiations, for example by carrying out clandestine leadership
identification and training, followed by rapid recruitment, in-plant agitation, and
Legal filings.
Now that I have summarized the general debate on how to protect workers' rights,
the next section will examine the specifics of Guatemala's garment sector and the
country's labor rights context. This review will help us to understand just how
surprising the recent Guatemalan labor rights' victories are.
2.2: Why Guatemala?
Guatemala Exemplifies the GLobalization of Apparel
The development of the Central American apparel sector, and specifically that of
Guatemala, exemplifies the trend of the globalization of the garment industry. Over
the past thirty years, garment manufacturing has undergone a massive translocation
as traditional northern manufacturers have moved toward outsourcing to independent
producers. Changes in fashion markets have Led buyers in search of short lead times,
short runs, flexible production, and low costs. This quest has led to the expansion of
global production and increasing downward pressure on working conditions.5 2
From 1985 to the present, Central American nations have become significant
producers for the international apparel market. In effect, the apparel industry has
37
50 Dr. Armbruster-Sandoval is a Professor of Chicano Studies at University of California, Santa Barbara
and has written extensively on cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas.
served as the 'principal export link' between Central America and the international
economy. During this period, countries such as Honduras, Dominican Republic, EL
Salvador, Costa Rica, and GuatemaLa have jumped to stand among the top twenty-five
country sources of apparel for the North American market.5 3 The total Central
American market share of US appareL imports is now approximately twelve percent,
with Honduras supplying four percent and Guatemala and El Salvador three percent
each.5 4
Today, the Guatemalan apparel sector is composed of more than two-hundred-and-
twenty-six apparel factories, thirty-nine textiLe milltts and two-hundred-and-seventy-
seven accessories firms generating 141,638 jobs. The apparel and textile industry
account for 1.4 percent of Guatemala's labor force. Guatemala's main apparel exports
are cotton and manmade fiber trousers and shorts, skirts, coats, baby wear,
nightwear, and woven and knitted shirts.5 5
WhiLe the maquiLa sector in many Caribbean countries is dominated by U.S. investors,
GuatemaLa's garment industry is driven by South Korean capitaL and owners. In fact,
seventy percent of investment in the Guatemaan apparel industry comes from South
Korean companies.5 6 Pamela Varley of the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) explains that as South Korean corporations faced increasing domestic wages,
51 Frundt (1999) and Armbruster-Sandoval (1999).
52 Barrientos (2002) and Hale (2002).
53 Mortimore (2002).
54 VESTEX (2003b).
55 VESTEX (2003a).
56 Barrie (2004).
38
__ __
they looked to countries Like Guatemala to remain competitive and maintain profit
margins.57 These investors were especially attracted by tax and tariff incentives
offered to foreign investors. As one Korean factory owner in GuatemaLa commented,
"The benefit for Central America is that it is close to the US and can meet short lead
time orders better than Low labor cost countries Like China, Vietnam and Indonesia."5 8
An interview of a Korean garment factory owner in Guatemala City by the IRRC
revealed that the company "operated in Korea for more than twenty-five years, but
wages and union activity started to rise very quickly during the 1980s. So, we opened
our first plant in Guatemala in 1985...The wage rates are much Lower and the union
less of a threat." 59
The expansion of Central America's export markets can be traced to the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), enacted by US Congress in August 1983. This
program was intended to diversify production and exports from the region by
providing tax incentives and trade preferences to investors in non-traditional
economic sectors. In the next twenty years, exports to the US from the region
increased dramatically. Furthermore, in 1986, President Reagan implemented a
"Special Access Program" for textiles and apparel. 6 0 In 1990, the passage of the CBERA
Expansion Act extended the permanent duty-free treatment that most goods
57 Varley (1998).
58 Barrie (2004).
59 Varley (1998).
60 Frundt (1998).
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produced in the Caribbean Basin region receive upon entry into the U.S. market.
Under the original Law, this duty-free eLigibiLity was to expire in September 1995.61
On May 18, 2000, President Clinton signed into Law the United States-Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act (CBTPA) as part of the Trade and DeveLopment Act of 2000. The
CBTPA expands the benefits granted under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).62
Under CBTPA, apparel manufactured from U.S. thread and textiles can enter the
United States free of quota and duty. The legislation also requires the President to
take account of the beneficiary country's progress in a number of areas, such as
workers' rights, intellectual property, and environmental protection.63 ' 4
GuatemaLa provides the perfect case study for the impacts of the CBI on the Central
American garment industry and more generally for the transition that has occurred in
the global garment industry in the past twenty years. From 1985 to 1995 Guatemalan
shipments to the U.S. increased from $15 million to $608 million, as buyers such as
Calvin Klein, Liz CLaiborne, Perry Ellis, Levi Strauss, Guess, London Fog, Wrangler, and
Van Heusen began to source from Guatemala (See Figure 2-2). Apparel became the
61 US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (2004).
62 The Caribbean Basin Initiative, or CBI, is a general term used to refer to the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act of 1983 (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990
(CBERA Expansion Act), and the U.S.- Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 (CBTPA),
collectively.
63 US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (2004).
64 "This Locked the Caribbean nations into an assembly role. The product was grown, spun, woven,
designed and cut in the USA, shipped to the Caribbean for assembly, then sent back for marketing. US
companies found it more convenient to do this in countries close by than to ship the cut fabric to Asia.
Hence the Asian producers tend to be providing complete apparel to the US market at the higher end.
In other words, geographic proximity reinforces the assembly function of Caribbean countries while the
higher costs of transport have forced Asian producers into more integrated manufacture of up-market
items." ILO (1999).
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third most valuable export after coffee and sugar, and Guatemala is now ranked in
16th position among the twenty-five principal country sources of apparel for the
North American market.65 In the fifteen year period from 1985 to 2000, Guatemala's
market share in North America increased by 2,737 percent and apparel exports as a
percentage of GuatemaLa's exports rose by 2,181 percent. 6 6
Figure 2-2: Increase in US Apparel Imports from the Caribbean Basin, 1993-199967
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Most recently, beginning in January of 2003, GuatemaLa joined the US and other
Central American countries in the negotiation of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA). The United States and Central American countries reached an
agreement in January 2004 and are now awaiting approval of the pact by US Congress.
65 Frundt (1999).
66 Mortimore (2002).
67 Figure 3.1 reproduced from Maquila Solidarity Network (2000). Original Source: United States
International Trade Commission.
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According to the US Trade Representative, CAFTA phases out tariffs and trade barriers
through a cutting-edge pact which is designed to promote economic growth and
expand U.S. opportunities in the important Central American regional market.68 In
the words of a Korean investor in Guatemala,
The main factor favoring CAFTA is that it would extend duty-free
benefits to fabrics and yarns made in Central American countries
(Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador and the
Dominican Republic), the NAFTA region (Mexico, Canada and Chile) -
and in some cases Asia as well. 69
Guatemala continues to be at the center of the global garment industry and is central
to the United States' economic strategy in the face of increasing global competition.
In brief, Guatemala is representative of those developing countries that have joined
the global apparel trade in the last twenty to thirty years by providing international
investors in an increasingly competitive sector with tax breaks, lower wages, less
labor enforcement, faster turn-around times, and proximity to a huge consumer
market.
Violations of Labor Rights Are Widespread and Well Documented
Over the past decades, the widespread violation of workers' rights in Guatemala's
apparel industry has been documented time and time again in the international news.
For example, the six-year struggle by the Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) union in
Guatemala City to gain recognition by management and the Ministry of Labor resulted
in several public reports on the state of labor rights in the country. Most notably, a
Human Rights Watch investigation uncovered that both PVH management and the
42
68 USTR (2003).
69 Barrie (2004).
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Guatemalan government had violated the PVH workers' rights. As a result, PVH CEO
Bruce Klastky was forced to admit that the Guatemalan government has abrogated its
responsibilities for enforcing workers' rights.70
In April 1997 UNITE71 researcher and Guatemalan sociology student Thelma Sanchez
investigated the conduct of three factories in Guatemala that sourced to Alfred
Angelo. Her report documented that the maquila factories were in violation of many
of Guatemala's basic labor aws.72 Furthermore, the UN Verification Mission in
Guatemala (MINUGUA) reported that from 1994 to 2002, there were twenty-one
complaints brought against Guatemala before the ILO for violations of union rights.73
The Guatemalan independent monitoring group, Commission for the Verification of
Corporate Codes of Conduct (COVERCO), summarizes that state of abor rights in
Guatemala:
In today's global economy, workers in low-wage, abor-intensive export
industries...often work under substandard labor conditions. Regulation
and enforcement of labor laws is often weak or nonexistent in these
sectors... Guatemala's export sectors are no exception...The increasing
need for employment combined with a pervasive culture of fear and
lawlessness, creates a difficult but necessary climate in which to
promote respect for workers' rights in Guatemala's growing export
industries. Some employers openly harass and threaten workers who
advocate for their basic legal rights through intimidation, bribery and
physical abuse. Union leaders and vocal workers are routinely harassed
and fired. Child labor, irregular compensation of workers, and health
and safety violations are commonplace.74
70 Varley (1998).
71 UNITE is the Union of Needletrades, Textiles, and Industrial Employees.
72 Varley (1998).
73 MINUGUA (2003): 45.
74 COVERCO (2004).
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Guatemala's Government Is Representatively Absent in Enforcing Labor Law
Guatemala is a country that is currently rebuilding its government after thirty-six
years of civil war. Within recent memory, the GuatemaLan military was able to
assassinate union organizers with impunity. Throughout this period, the Ministry of
Labor has been an under-funded, under-motivated agency that accepts bribes, carries
out few inspections of labor violations, and drags its feet in approving union
applications. Furthermore, the country's judicial system is severely overburdened
and therefore routinely ignores the complaints of workers and petitions of unions. In
sum, "the Guatemalan government, like many developing nations' governments, was
very much influenced by the ocal business community and really had abrogated its
responsibilities."75 This tack of enforcement represents the worst case scenario of a
government that is unable or unwilltting to enforce labor laws and protect labor rights.
For the Length of GuatemaLa's thirty-six year civiL war, a series of military and civiLian
governments perpetrated shocking human rights abuses against the Guatemalan
populous, with particularly brutal treatment of indigenous populations and trade
unionists. In fact, anti-union sentiments and actions were at the heart of the
ongoing, brutally vioLent civil struggLe. Unions were, in effect, outlawed and workers'
attempts to unionize were met with everything from mass firings to executions.
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, paramilitary forces responded to abor
75 Bruce Klatsky, CEO of PVH in Varley (1998).
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organizing with kidnappings and death threats, and unionists were forced
underground.76
Beginning in 1986 and lasting through 1997, human rights groups and unions filed
petitions of Guatemala's US trade benefits under the General System of Preferences
(GSP). The complaints that comprised these petitions were numerous, but focused
most intensely on (1) violations of freedom of association through physical abuses,
military action, and labor code restrictions; (2) child-labor; and (3) poor working
conditions including wages, health, and safety.77 Specific complaints about the
structure and functioning of the Guatemalan labor system's key institutions arose
repeatedly during this period. The Ministry of Labor was slow to respond to union
applications, provided few inspections of filed violations, and referred most cases to
the over-burdened labor courts. The few courts were overtaxed by a backlog of
thousands of cases, each of which had to proceed through a series of complex
bureaucratic procedures.78
The GSP complaints were ignored by the US Trade Representative (USTR) until 1992.
When Guatemala realized that the USTR might accept the 1992 petition to revoke
trade benefits, the Ministry of Labor reacted. In November 1992, Guatemala's
Congress approved a new labor code which simplified union registrations, increased
fines, and strengthened court procedures.
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76 Frundt (1999).
77 Frundt (1998): 143.
78 Ibid.
In spite of these reforms, violations of labor rights continued throughout the 1990s
with twenty-one official complaints filed before the ILO from 1994 to 2000.7 9 As
Ricardo Changala, former labor attach6 for the UN Verification Mission for Guatemala,
explained:
There are neither magic solutions nor shortcuts. You could say: Well,
what we have to do is improve labor courts." Perfect. Let's create twenty
more courts. Great. But where are the judges? Are they going to come
down from a flying saucer? Are they going to come from the international
community? Are we going to have a Norwegian judge hold court in
Guatemala? In this country there are no schools for training labor judges-
there are none-let's get this clear. And they cannot exist because there
is no academia...it was all destroyed during the war. We are 30 or 40
years behind...so things cannot change over night.80
In 1996, under the supervision of the United Nations, Guatemala signed eleven peace
accords, officially bringing the civil war to an end. A subsection of the Accord on
Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation addresses labor relations in an
attempt to acknowledge the historically conflictive nature of Guatemala's economic
relations. The accords emphasize not only the need to increase incomes of workers,
but also stress the importance of promoting a culture of negotiation in the economic
arena. This focus on negotiation will allow the Ministry of Labor to resolve disputes
and facilitate actions that will benefit all parties involved.81 Specifically, the abor
compact commits the government to strengthening existing labor laws and facilitating
the legal recognition of new unions.82
79 MINUGUA (2003).
80 Quoted in Rodriguez (2003): 60.
81 MINUGUA (2000): 302.
82 Jonas (2000): 157.
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According to MINUGUA, there was an initial flurry of action surrounding compliance
with the labor compact.83 In May 1996, the Ministry of Labor shortened the process
and the legislated Ministry turn-around time for unions to obtain legal status; the
Ministry also initiated a program to walk unionists through the application process.8 4
And in 1997, the US removed Guatemala from five-year probationary status under GSP
review. The USTR stated that Guatemala had made significant progress in improving
respect for workers' rights, specifically by reforming violation response procedures,
simplifying procedures for union registration, and doubling the number of labor
inspectors. 85
However, this response to the Peace Accords was short-lived, again according to
MINUGUA. In effect,
from the viewpoint of Guatemalan workers and GSP petitions, very little
had changed beyond the reduction in overt physical violence. Labor
groups experienced persistent delays in union registrations, inadequate
Labor inspections, and very limited bargaining. Virtually no employers
had been cited for violations. The courts hardly operated.86
The PVH union's six year struggle with management and government exemplifies the
continued troubles. According to Human Rights Watch, which investigated the case,
the Ministry of Labor should have intervened in the conflict between PVH
management and the union, but instead "abdicate[d] its responsibilities and invite[d]
the union and PVH to take their concerns to the labor courts." USGLEP equated this
83 MINUGUA, (2003).
84 Varley (1998).
85 Ibid.
86 Frundt (1998): 163
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action with 'burying the dispute.'87 Although the union eventually emerged with a
collective bargaining agreement in 1997, in December 1998 the factory was abruptly
closed and PVH transferred production to other regional non-union factories.88
In 2000, MINUGUA issued a summary verification report on compliance with the labor
accords. This report stated that MINUGUA's verification of the labor pacts had
"demonstrated the persistence of an enormous imbalance between the quantitative
and qualitative severity of the country's labor problems and the human and material
resources that are dedicated by the state to resolve these problems."89 Specifically,
MINUGUA documented a persistent lack of institutional unity in the Labor Ministry,
slowness and lack of efficiency of the judicial system, and grave violations to the
fundamental human rights of union activists.90
In 2001, in response to the reports from the ILO and MINUGUA, pressure from the US
Embassy, and the renewed threat of GSP withdrawal, the Guatemalan Congress
undertook another round of labor reforms.91 The 2001 reforms most notably gave the
Labor inspectorate the authority to immediately levy fines on factories that are
violating aws, rather than sending the cases to the labor courts. This reform was
also noted for giving more power and autonomy to Labor inspectors.92
87 Varley (1998).
88 US/LEAP (2003).
89 MINUGUA (2000): 302.
90 Ibid: 302.
91 Personal Communication with Ricardo Changala, former MINUGUA Labor inspector. March 19, 2004.
92 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. March 25, 2004. Personal
Communication with General Inspector Celeste Ayala. March 24, 2004. Personal Communication with
Enrique Torres, legal council for FESTRAS. February 2, 2004.
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Credible and Respected Independent Monitoring Exists in Guatemala
The independent monitoring group, Commission for the Verification of Corporate
Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) was formed by a group of professionals and leaders in
Guatemalan civil society in 1997 as a pioneering effort in the independent monitoring
of working conditions in Guatemala's garment factories and agricultural export
industries. Per its own mission statement,
COVERCO provides independent monitoring and verification that meets
rigorous standards of accuracy, transparency, and non-partisanship. As a
not-for-profit, non-governmental organization with a multidisciplinary
approach, we can provide authoritative and trusted monitoring that can
give customers the confidence that they demand.9 3
In 1999, Liz Claiborne signed a cutting edge agreement with COVERCO to launch a
pilot project to verify working conditions in two of its Guatemalan supplier factories
located outside Guatemala City, the Korean-owned, sister factories of Choishin and
Cimatextiles.9 4 Through this project, Liz Claiborne became the first apparel retailer
in the world to voluntarily implement large-scale independent monitoring in its
supplier factories. LCI worked with the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF),
Business for Social Responsibility, UNITE, and other groups to identify potential
monitors in Guatemala. 95
COVERCO has earned respect throughout Guatemala and the world as an independent
verification team that clearly respects the rights of workers and unions. It has been
93 COVERCO (1999).
94 These conversations between LCI and COVERCO regarding the pilot project started in a very
particular historical moment. In Guatemala, following the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 there
was a strong focus on working conditions and labor justice. Internationally, the White House had just
developed the FLA (from the Apparel Industry Partnership). Personal Communication with Homero
Fuentes & Dennis Smith, Coordinator and Director of COVERCO. January 8, 2004.
49
described as one of the few organizations in the world that has Learned to balance the
requirements that allow for truly independent monitoring that is respected by all
sides of the debate.96 As such, its presence in Guatemala provides an interesting
context in which to examine the interaction between workers, unions, MNCs, local
management, and independent monitors.
The following chapter will show these interactions through a detailed explanation of
the three cases. The case descriptions will confirm the surprising nature of these
victories given the aforementioned Guatemalan economic and institutional context.
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95 COVERCO (1999) and Varley (1998).
96 Personal communications with Laura Podolsky and Mary Bellman, organizers for STITCH and US/LEAP.
Personal communications with US/LEAP organizer. All in January 2004.
CHAPTER 3: THE CASE STUDIES
The following chapter will provide the details of the Choishin, Cimatextiles, and
Nobland cases and then of each case. The description of the case studies in this
chapter will allow the reader to understand how a union formed in each factory, how
each union achieved a collective bargaining agreement, how independent monitoring
was carried out at each factory, and how the Guatemalan government participated in
each case. This section will allow the reader to understand the similarities and
differences across the cases. These details will then be used as a basis in later
chapters to explore the descriptive value of existing bodies of literature and to
propose a synthesized model for protecting workers' rights in the developing world.
Through my interviews and investigation, I uncovered the following history of the
formation of three unions and the negotiation of three collective bargaining
agreements in Guatemala's export garment factories. Section 3.2 will explain the
four year history of the Choishin and Cimatextiles factories. Section 3.3 will describe
the six month union organizing effort at Nobland and Section 3.4 will bring us up to
date on labor conditions in Guatemala.
3.1: Choishin and Cimatextiles (Choi/Cima)
The Factories
The sister factories of Industrial Textiles Choishin SA and Cimatextiles SA are located
approximately thirty kilometers outside of Guatemala City in the town of Villa Nueva.
The two factories are Korean owned and produce higher-end women's knit garments
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for Liz CLaiborne and Talbot's. The first factory, Choishin, opened in Guatemala in
1989. Having anticipated that the factory's tax exemptions would expire in 1999, the
Korean company opened the second factory, Cimatextiles, within the same compound
in 1998.
As of January 2004, the two factories employed a total of approximately four hundred
workers on eighteen production lines. The total capacity of the two factories is 900
pieces a day from each line, or an average total of 384,000 dozen pieces a month.
Approximately seventy percent of this production capacity is used to produce
garments for Liz Claiborne. LCI has been working with Choi/Cima since 1992.9 7
Union Organizing
In 1999, the AFL-CIO Labor Solidarity Center; the International Textile, Garment a
Leather Workers Federation; and the GuatemaLan union federation FESTRAS began a
joint investigation of working conditions at the Choishin and Cimatextiles factories.9 8
This investigation uncovered worker dissatisfaction and violations of workers' rights.
The international organizations perceived that this factory seemed ideal for
organizing because Liz Claiborne was such a vulnerable buyer; LCI had invested
considerable time and resources in protecting its reputation through its work with the
Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), the FLA, and independent monitoring
organizations. 9 9
97 Personal Communication with Alberto Choi, Administrative Manager of Choishin and Cimatextiles.
January 23, 2004.
98 Personal Communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. January 14, 2004.
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The aforementioned alliance began organizing the factories in 2000 with the
additional support of STITCH'00 and the US Labor Education in the Americas Project
(US/LEAP). I spoke with representatives of these organizations and with the union
members themselves to understand the one-year process of clandestine organizing.101
During this time, external organizers (former garment workers and young idealistic
GuatemaLans) employed by the ITGLWF and FESTRAS assisted the unions in recruiting
twenty-five percent of the factory workers, the percentage required by aw to force
contract negotiation.'02 The union members would propose candidates to approach
and the organizers would conduct one-to-one house recruiting visits.103 Laura
Podolsky explained that STITCH organizers Like herself "helped out with house visits
and accompanied organizers at their request. I don't know if you've been out to Villa
Nueva, but the organizers didn't really feel safe walking around there at night by
themselves. It's a rough area."'04
By July 9, 2001, the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions had reached the twenty-five
percent threshold and went public by applying for official state recognition from the
Ministry of Labor. They submitted their incorporation papers, bylaws, and
registration request to the General Directorate of Labor. Members of the new unions
appeared before the 5th Labor Court on the same day and requested that the court
99 Personal Communication with USLEAP organizer. January 14, 2004.
'00 STITCH is a network of US women unionists, organizers, and activists that seeks to build connections
between Central American and US women organizing for economic justice.
101 Personal Communication with Laura Podolsky, organizer for STITCH. January 12, 2004. Personal
Communication with US/LEAP organizer. January 14, 2004.
102 Guatemalan Labor Code (Decree 14-41) Article 51.
103 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004. Personal
Communication with Laura Podolsky, organizer for STITCH. January 12, 2004.
104 Personal Communication. January 12, 2004.
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declare 'employment immobility.' This emplazamiento was approved the same day
and the unions were officially recognized by the Ministry of Labor on July 24, 2001.15
In an interview, the General Director of the Ministry of Labor, Luis Cedeio Merel,
confirmed that his office received the unions' applications, that they were completely
in order, and that they were processed within the time frame required by Law.'06
In response to the formation of the unions, the Choi/Cima factory management began
an intense campaign of harassment and intimidation of the union supporters. This
campaign soon escalated into mob attacks reportedly orchestrated by company
supervisors.'07 Two workers I spoke with described how, for example, they were fired
on July 24 just for being members of the SITRACIMA union.108
Independent Monitoring
At the time of the anti-union response, Liz Claiborne was able to call on the
independent monitoring group, COVERCO, to verify the reports that the company was
receiving on violence and anti-worker actions in the factories. LCI had signed an
agreement with COVERCO in 1999 to verify working conditions at the Choishin and
Cimatextiles factories and this monitoring relationship continued through 2003.1° 9
In 1999, at the start of the project, LCI had negotiated with the Choi/Cima factory
management to assure that COVERCO would have unrestricted access to the factories,
105 The details of the application process were verified by COVERCO and published in their Third Public
Report (2001).
106 Personal Communication. March 23, 2004.
1 07 Also confirmed by COVERCO (2001).
108 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004.
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management, workers, and payroll and personnel files. 0° COVERCO's role was to
record cases of non-compliance with LCI's Standards of Engagement, international
labor codes, and national labor regulations. COVERCO agreed to provide LCI with
regular updates on the factory situation and to present periodic public reports
summarizing the findings. LCI committed to "maintain fluid communications with
COVERCO and with management of the local factory, and to take appropriate
measures to ensure compliance with their Standards.""'
COVERCO conducted eighty nine visits in the first year. The methodology for
communicating with the workers included off-site meetings, telephone calls and
worker visits to the COVERCO office, conversations with COVERCO's onsite monitors,
and an onsite padlocked comment box. 112 COVERCO describes its role as "making a
film of the factory rather than taking a snapshot," i.e. documenting the patterns of
management-worker relations in general rather than at any specific moment. For
example, COVERCO's monitors verify not just if the factory has bathrooms, but more
importantly whether the workers are allowed to use them. 13
COVERCO published two reports (1999 and 2000) that documented the general
violations of standards and laws in the two factories. The major complaints from
workers and violations recorded by COVERCO included verbal abuse, forced overtime,
109 COVERCO (1999) and Varley (1998).
110 Personal Communication with Homero Fuentes E Dennis Smith, Coordinator and Director of
COVERCO. January 8, 2004.
11 The terms of the pilot project agreement are explained in COVERCO's First Public Report (1999).
112 Personal Communication with Homero Fuentes E Dennis Smith, Coordinator and Director of
COVERCO. January 8, 2004.
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problems with wages and production bonuses, refused permission for medicaLt eave,
locked doors, and substandard bathrooms. The most shocking case was when a
female worker lost her baby when she miscarried on the factory floor after her Korean
supervisor refused her permission to leave and see a doctor.114
At the time of the anti-union response, COVERCO was visiting the factory ess
frequently, but was quickly asked by LCI to return and verify the situation. In August
2001, COVERCO published a third special report on the conflict that ensued around
the formation of the union. This report verified that the workers' rights had been
violated when the factory management orchestrated retaliation and physical attacks
against union members. Specifically, the report confirmed that: (1) on July 10
"managers began to mobilize supervisors in an effort to discourage union affiliation
among workers. Managers suggested that union affiliation would Lead to the closing of
the factories. Managers also suggested that the presence of a union would hurt
workers financially;" (2) on July 18 "anti-union workers and supervisors form[ed]
unruly groups that approach[ed] individual union members, demanding that they
resign from the factory and the union....Violent demonstrations erupt[ed] in the
factories, targeting union workers;" and (3) on July 19, "several union workers and
one COVERCO monitor [we]re roughed up....Senior factory managers continue[d] to
insist that they are unable to control anti-union workers." COVERCO's visits to the
factories had confirmed that the Choi/Cima management had violated the rights of
unionized workers according to GuatemaLan Labor Law and international Labor code.
113 Ibid.
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Pressure on the MNC
At the time of this conflict, the unions used their network of international solidarity
groups to put pressure on Liz Claiborne to maintain production in the Guatemala
factories. Through action alerts, Letter-writing campaigns, and demonstrations,
groups like US/LEAP and the Workers' Rights Consortium mobilized their consumer
and student supporters to demand that LCI 'do the right thing.'"' 5 As Mary Mejia,
Guatemalan organizer with FESTRAS and the AFL-CIO SoLidarity Center explained, "If
a worker filed the complaint directly, the brand never would have received it. But if
an external group like consumers submit it, that has more impact. Consumers have a
Lot of power to pressure a company on Labor rights.""16
Because of reports from COVERCO and pressure from international NGOs and
consumers, LCI intervened at Choi/Cima. The company sent a letter directly to the
workers on JuLy 25 stating that Liz CLaiborne supports the right of workers to choose
to join or to not join a union, and that Liz CLaiborne would continue business at both
factories as long as this right is respected, the quality of the production remains
satisfactory, and the current situation has been resolved in a peaceful manner. 17
The Goal: A Collective Bargaining Agreement
Once the union went public and had gained recognition from Liz CLaiborne, it began
to pursue its goal of collective negotiations. However, it continued to face resistance
114 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004. Verified by
COVERCO in its First Public Report (1999).
115 Personal Communication with Laura Podolsky, organizer for STITCH. January 12, 2004. Personal
Communication with US/LEAP organizer. January 14, 2004.
116 Personal Communication, February 2, 2004.
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from company management throughout this period. The unions faced continued
refusals to negotiate from management because the unions had not attained the
twenty-five percent evel of union membership required by Guatemalan law to force
collective bargaining negotiations. As Pinciri Fernando, the country representative
for Liz Claiborne explains
the factory management said that the law required twenty-five percent
of the workers...What they expressed is that if it is only ten to twenty
people, it is unfair to accept the union if the other people don't agree
and if the country laws don't comply. So they decided not to accept
that way. 1 18
However, from the unions' perspective, they could not disclose the true membership
of the unions for fear of physical reprisal and firings. As Laura Podolsky, a organizer
for STITCH, explains, the continuing campaign
had a really hard time generating membership and recruiting people,
and other workers continued to get harassed and threatened despite the
high level of publicity surrounding the case...Everyone was scared and no
one wanted to join the union. They kind of lost their advantage. 119
In addition to the physical violence, the management had sent the message to the
workforce that the factories were going to close because of the unions, creating fear
and resentment among co-workers. The unions' leaders explained to me that the
long-term result was that coworkers would not make their union affiliation public and
that friends would shun them for fear of being fired.120
The union and its supporters called on the Guatemalan Labor Ministry to intervene in
the case through a series of complaints and petitions. Throughout this period, the
117 COVERCO (2001).
118 Personal Communication, January 13, 2004.
119 PersonaL Communication, January 12, 2004.
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unions filed complaints against management's violations of labor regulations and
against the corrupt government labor inspectors to the Ministry of Labor. Labor
Inspector Cesar Gatica confirmed that between July 2001 and April 2002 there were
over 200 complaints filed by the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions with the Ministry of
Labor.121
On July 25, 2001, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor called a meeting between the
management and the unions to discuss the situation. On August 9, the management
signed an agreement with the unions in which the company promised to respect
workers' rights, reinstate workers who were forced to resign, and punish those
responsible for the violence.122 However, according to the unions, compliance with
this agreement was minimal and harassment of union members continued.
Eventually, the continuing complaints filed by the unions against the labor inspectors
motivated the Guatemalan government to act again.123 On April 11, 2002, the
Minister of Labor Victor Moirera decreed that a permanent labor inspector be assigned
to the Choishin Et Cimatextiles factories until the cases were resolved. The decree
gave this Inspector the right to call meetings between all the actors in the case and to
review and resolve all pending problems. If the complaints could not be resolved
120 Personal Communication with the SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions, January 15, 2004.
121 Personal Communication, January 30, 2004.
122 COVERCO (2001).
123 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. January 30, 2004.
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through negotiation, then the inspector had the authority to assess a fine on the
factory.1 2 4
When Inspector Cesar Gatica took on the permanent position, the situation was very
contentious and none of the parties would cede any ground. Because the goal was
the negotiation and signing of a collective bargaining agreement, Inspector Gatica had
been selected based on his experience with mediation techniques. 125
Thus began the protracted process of negotiation between management and the
union. Inspector Gatica mediated bimonthly meetings between the factory
management and the union from April 2002 until July 2003. Although the meetings
were at times tedious and seemed to make little progress, they continued in order to
maintain the dialogue between all the parties. As Gatica makes clear,
There was an environment of non-tolerance because of the previous
violence. The goal in this context was to get the parties to resolve the
problem through direct negotiation....These meetings were not about
coercive power, but rather were about not allowing the conversation to
break down. Although the meetings were tedious, they were
important.126
However, the tedium and lack of forward movement did take its toll on the unions
and on the organizing team. STITCH organizer Podolsky explains that she witnessed
considerable tension and conflict among the unions' leadership teams during this
period:
When it continues to be stressful and there's no solid forward
movement, members start to fight among themselves. A lack of
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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concrete forward movement was coupled with confusion between the
different groups that were supporting the project about who was
running the project. There were also conflicts between the organizers
in FESTRAS-different notions of organizing, strategies, relationships
with workers. And conflicts between different external groups-in
terms of setting an agenda, i.e. different strategies and different
philosophies. 2 7
So it was during this period that the unions broke off their relationship with the
international solidarity groups and with FESTRAS. 128
Nonetheless, from late 2001 to mid-2003, the efforts to protect the workers' rights
continued on both the international and local levels. The international advocacy
campaign continued through coordination with US students, unions, consumers, and
religious organizations to pressure Liz Claiborne.'2 9 Homero Fuentes told me that, at
this time, COVERCO also assisted the unions in filing an official complaint against the
factories with the Fair Labor Association. 130 And David Morales, Director of FESTRAS,
verified that coordination with Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese unions and social
movements also pressured the Korean president of Choi/Cima to focus on improving
labor rights.'31
According to Labor Inspector Cesar Gatica, during this time, international pressure
was also mounting on the Guatemalan government due to a series of coordinated
events and actions. First, in December 2002, the AFL-CIO submitted a petition before
127 Personal Communication, January 12, 2004.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Personal Communication. January 27, 2004.
131 Personal Communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. January 14, 2004.
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the US Trade Representative requesting that Guatemala's General System of
Preferences status be revoked due to continuing labor rights violations, particularly in
the Choishin a Cimatextiles cases.'3 2
Then, in April 2003, US Congressman Sander Levin (D-Michigan) visited Guatemala as
part of a Central American tour focusing on concern over Labor violations in the
context of Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) negotiations. His report-
back to Congress documented labor rights violations in Guatemala and increased
pressure on Guatemala to resolve the high-profile Choi/Cima case and improve Labor
rights in order to accede to CAFTA.133
When Guatemalan Minister of Labor Victor Moirera went to the International Labor
Organization meeting in Geneva, Switzerland in June 2003 he was faced with
considerable pressure on the Guatemalan government, most strikingly in the form of
an international complaint against the country. 13 4 After a June 12 meeting in Geneva
with Neil Kearney, president of the ITGLWF, Minister Moreira returned to Guatemala
and relayed his demands to Inspector Gatica that the case be immediately resolved by
the Labor Inspectorate.'3 5 To show the government's determination to resolve the
case and improve its international image, the Ministry of Economy threatened to take
132 Pasquarella (2003).
133 Levin (2003).
134 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. January 30, 2004.
135 Ibid.
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away the Choi/Cima factories' export License unless collective bargaining agreements
were negotiated quickly.136
In response, the Choi/Cima management agreed to negotiate the agreements at a
June 26 meeting and the collective bargaining agreements were finalized on July 14,
2003.137138 The collective bargaining agreements granted workers wage increases,
chiLdcare, a health clinic, and changes in human resources personnel among other
things. 39 Throughout the negotiation process, the unions were supported by their
international allies; specifically, Neil Kearney was present at their side throughout
the negotiations of the contract. 140
The Ministry of Labor required that the factories be monitored for three months by
Inspector Gatica to confirm compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.' 41
The Fair Labor Association also asked COVERCO to monitor the factory. 14 2 In January
2004, Inspector Gatica issued a report certifying that Choishin and Cimatextiles had
complied with all requirements to date.'43 However, according to conversations with
COVERCO and the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA union members, the management has
addressed many issues on the surface, but has not achieved true compliance. For
136 Maza (2003).
137 These dates were confirmed through an examination of the government file for Choishin and
Cimatextiles case.
138 The manager of Choi/Cima Alberto Choi refused to comment on what factors influenced the
company to make this decision in the end.
139 Collective Bargaining Agreement, July 14 2003.
140 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004.
141 This period was later extended to six months. Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor
Inspector. January 30, 2004.
142 Personal Communication with Homero Fuentes, Coordinator of COVERCO. January 27, 2004.
143 Attained as part of the Ministry of Labor's public record of the case.
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example, management has provided childcare and Christmas parties, but continues to
pressure workers to work long hours. The workers also report that they are 'allowed'
to leave at 4:30pm (the end of the egaL workday), but management is taking away
the group of buses that take workers home at 4:30pm, in essence requiring them to
work overtime and Leave on the 6pm bus.144
According to some organizers, the result of the campaign and negotiation is a weak
union with a collective bargaining agreement.145 The unions' Leadership expressed to
me their continued fear of management reprisal and explained how because of this
fear they will not release the names of the unions' members to management;
therefore, they still do not technically have twenty-five percent of the workforce as
members. 46 Furthermore, recent communications from the unions have described
continued verbal and physical abuse of workers by management, firings of union
members, and daily announcements over the factory Loudspeaker that
The company has millionaire tosses because they are the only ones to
pay a minimum wage that is higher than the established ones, that staff
can leave at 16.30 pm, that they have children's care center, medical
service and they also emphasize the economical benefits obtained by
means of the CBA. According to them all of these make the company to
be not competitive. The announcements also express the imminent
closing of the factory and state that it is workers' responsibility to
rescue the company, concluding to ask the workforce to cooperate with
overtime work, while requesting for no justified absenteeism or workers
are to be suspended (sic).1 47
144 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004.
145 Personal Communication with US/LEAP organizer, David Morales (Director of FESTRAS) and Laura
Podolsky (organizer for STITCH). January 2004.
146 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004.
147 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. April 27, 2004.
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Because the unions lack leverage, they continue to be intimidated by a
management team that is conscious that the workers cannot do much to
protest. For example, the union leaders explained to me that workers still
have difficulty getting permission to leave the jobsite to go to the National
Health Service for medical appointments. 14 8 This situation is seen by some
organizers to be emblematic of a "hollow victory," i.e. weak local unions that
were supported by a strong international movement. 149
3.2: Nobland (NB)
The Factories
Nobland International is a Korean garment manufacturer of knitwear and woven
apparel specializing in exports of women's clothing to the U.S. market. It owns
offshore sewing factories in Vietnam and Guatemala and has 30 sub-sewing factories
operating in Korea, Saipan, and Indonesia. Its customers include designer brands like
Diane Von Furstenburg, Donna Karan New York, Michael Kors, BCBG Max Azria and
retail specialty stores like GAP, Old Navy, Banana Republic, Casual Corner, and
Victoria's Secret and department stores such as J.C. Penney, Target, and Mervyn's.
Liz Claiborne is also one of its major customers. 50
The Nobtand SA factory in Guatemala City was established in 2000 and produces
women's knitwear for Gap, JCPenney, and Target. It is located in the heart of the
148 Ibid.
149 Personal Communication with US/LEAP organizer and Laura Podolsky, organizer for STITCH. January
2004.
150 Nobland (2004).
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city in the lower-class Zone 5. This factory employs approximately four hundred and
fifty workers.151
Union Organizing
In February 2003, thirty workers at the Nobland factory joined together to form a
clandestine union.152 These workers, as individuals, had a history of filing complaints
against the factory management with the Ministry of Labor and of organizing work
stoppages.15 3 These actions were a reaction to the long-term conditions in the
factory, where workers reported that Korean and Guatemalan management
mistreated them by regularly closing the door early and locking them out of the
factory, and by carrying out mass firings every two months in order to later rehire the
workforce and avoid social security requirements.154 In June 2003, Mary Mejia of
FESTRAS and the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center learned of the incipient union and began
to provide support to these workers. Over the next four months the SITRANB union
expanded through leadership development and clandestine recruiting.155 The union
federation, FESTRAS, coordinated the union organizing campaign this time around,
with the AFL-CIO, ITGLWF, and US/LEAP playing more ancillary roles.' 5 6
On October 12, the Nobland factory management discovered the existence of the
union and immediately fired four union members. But the union was prepared for this
151 Hedgpeth (2003).
152 Personal Communication with SITRANB union. January 19, 2004.
153 Personal Communication with SITRANB union. January 19, 2004. Personal Communication with Mary
Mejia, organizer for FESTRAS and the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center. February 2, 2004.
154 Personal Communication with Mary Mejia. February 2, 2004.
155 Ibid.
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possibility; it had the Legal union documents in order and immediately filed them with
the Ministry of Labor. 157 The requested emplazamiento' 5 8 was granted by the labor
courts on October 16. The SITRANB union then met, elected official leadership, and
began an intensive membership drive. The first day after the union went public it
signed up fifty new members. It continued this strategy until it had attained a
membership of one-hundred-and-forty members. In contrast to the SITRACHOI and
SITRACIMA unions, the SITRANB union achieved a membership rate of nearly fifty
percent of factory workers in a short time.
Unlike in the Choi/Cima case, the Nobland management did not physically attack the
organized workers. Rather, as the union leaders described to me, management's
reaction was to employ scare tactics and illegal maneuvers to combat the union's
influence in the factory. For example, the management arranged daily religious
meetings at lunch to tell the workers that God does not approve of unions. When the
SITRANB union discovered these tactics, the leaders went to the meetings and
defended the role of the union.159 But this was not the end of management's
counterstrategies. In November, the management organized an alternate union
committee to replace the original SITRANB executive committee. Of the thirty
members of this alternative committee, nine were supervisors and the three leaders
of the committee were supervisors. This committee requested that the
156 Personal Communication with Edgar Torres, egal counsel for FESTRAS and David MoraLes, Director of
FESTRAS. February 2 and 3, 2004.
157 Information on the union organizing process was attained through Personal Communication with
SITRANB union. January 19, 2004.
158 Employment immobility.
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emplazamiento be lifted and changed the mailing address of the union so that they
would not receive notification of the changes. The union discovered this trickery
approximately ten days later and submitted an appeal to the Labor courts.'60
Independent Monitoring
Unlike in the Choi/Cima factories, there was no preexisting independent monitoring
program at the NobLand factory. However, Gap, for example, does have a corporate
code of conduct that it monitors internally at the Nobland factory. This was
confirmed by Mary Bellman of STITCH, who saw a Gap code of conduct poster in the
factory, and by the union leaders, who have witnessed Gap monitors in the factory.1 61
Despite this difference, as we took at the Nobland case, we will see that independent
monitoring is still a factor that is comparable across the cases. In the Choi/Cima
cases, monitoring was most important in verifying labor rights abuses at the moment
when the union formed, and I will show that the same is true at Nobland.
In December 2003, the unions and their international allies had been involved in
ongoing conversations with the Nobland management, as well as Gap, JCPenney, and
Target, for several months. Through these meetings, the union's supporters reported
what they saw as violations of the unions Legally recognized rights.162 In an effort to
disprove these allegations, the Korean management of NobLand offered to have
159 Personat Communication with Mary Mejia, organizer for FESTRAS and the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center.
February 2, 2004.
160 Personal Communication with US/LEAP organizer. January 29, 2004.
161 Personal Communications. January 8, 2004 and January 19, 2004.
162 Personal Communication with US/LEAP organizer. March 19, 2004.
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US/LEAP inspect the Nobland factory, believing that such an inspection would verify
that it was the union and not the management that was violating Guatemalan labor
law.1 63 US/LEAP declined this offer, because it did not feel like this was its role, but
offered a counterproposal.164 It arranged for an independent monitor, Roberto
Changala, who had previously worked on labor rights with MINUGUA, to conduct a
short-term independent verification. The factory owner, Keith Kim, agreed to the
monitoring plan.'65
Changala's ten-day independent verification assignment began on January 5, 2004.
According to the agreement between Nobland, Changala, and US/LEAP, Changala's
role in the factory was to verify very specific conditions relating to freedom of
association and potential violations to union rights. The company agreed to pay
Changala for his work. The ground rules clearly specified that Changala was not a
judge, but would give a technical opinion with no option for discussion or appeal from
either side. As an independent inspector, he was given access to the workers,
supervisors, management, all factory files and paperwork, and the government files
on the case.' 66
His ten-day investigation verified that the Nobland management had violated the
Guatemalan labor law and international labor code by impeding the union and defying
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Personal Communication with Ricardo Changaa, independent monitor at Nobland. March 19, 2004.
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the workers' freedom of association.'67 His report was presented to the workers and
the management and was used as the basis to request contract negotiations. 1 6 8
Pressure on the MNC
Throughout this period, the union's international allies, US/LEAP, WRC, and ITGLWF
were negotiating with the brands and with the Korean management to gain
recognition of the union. These actions were designed to send a message to the
brands and the Korean management that this situation could be resolved without
major conflict or else it could involve a major student and consumer campaign in the
US. In this case, the full-fledge international campaign never became necessary
because the brands and Nobland responded quickly to the direct pressures of the
union and its allies. For example, because of these coordinated conversations,
Korean management agreed to independent monitoring and accepted the results of
independent monitor Changala's report. 169
The Goal: A Collective Bargaining Agreement
As in the Choi/Cima case, the goal of the union campaign was the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement.170 SITRANB wanted to use conflict only as necessary
to arrive at these negotiations. The unions goals for this contract were, among other
things, no forced overtime, permission for time off to care for sick children,
167 Ibid (Changala).
168 Ibid (US/LEAP).
169 Details on these interactions were attained through conversations with US/LEAP. March 19, 2004.
170 Personal Communication with the SITRANB union. January 19, 2004. Personal Communication with
Enrique Torres, legal counsel for FESTRAS. February 2, 2004.
70
__
permission for medical leave, fair treatment (e.g. to threats, harassment, or sexual
harassment), clean bathrooms, and childcare. 171
At the request of the SITRANB union, Cesar Gatica was again appointed to resolve the
workers' complaints and move along negotiations of the collective bargaining
agreement. 172 Gatica explained that there were fifteen complaints filed in December
2003 and January 2004. However, in this case, none of the complaints were filed
against the labor inspectors; rather, all were filed against the factory management.
As of January 30, 2004, fourteen of those complaints had been resolved. 17 3
On January 20, the union submitted the collective bargaining agreement proposal.
Because the union had achieved considerably more than twenty-five percent (i.e.
nearly fifty percent) worker membership, the management was required by law to
respond to this request within thirty days.174 The parties started negotiating the
agreement on February 19, 2004. The Nobland management asked the Ministry of
Labor for space to meet for the negotiation and requested that the Labor Inspectorate
facilitate the meetings.17 5 The contract was achieved in spring 2004 in record time.
Because the contract has been so recently finalized, I was not able to investigate its
implementation and am, therefore, unable to report on whether the contract has
improved the working conditions at the Nobland factory.
171 Ibid (SITRANB).
172 Personal Communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. February 3, 2004.
173 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. January 30, 2004.
174 Ibid.
175 Personal Communication with General Inspector Celeste Ayala. March 24, 2004.
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3.3: A Final Development
The final part of this story has to do with the election in January 2004 of the Berger
presidential administration after eight years of presidential rule by the corrupt
Portillo administration. One of the first actions of the new government was to send
the newly appointed Minister of Labor Gallardo Flores to pay an official visit at the
Choi/Cima factories to check the status of the collective bargaining agreement and
affirm the new administration's commitment to labor rights.176 Cesar Gatica explains
that this demonstrated that
With the new government, there is an opening for dialogue and
communication. I have seen it from my perspective in the labor
inspectorate where we had the historic accomplishment of negotiating a
contract for a maquila that could have created a huge international
conflict for the Guatemalan government.17
Furthermore, the Berger administration is focusing on implementing a decree passed
in December 2003 by the previous administration that created a special sweatshop
commission within the Labor Inspectorate-the Special Inspectors Unit for Compliance
with Labor Laws in the Garment Sector. The overarching goal of the program is to
defend the rights of workers while maintaining a source of jobs for Guatemalans.178
This mandate appointed five inspectors with the most experience in maquila cases
and in mediation, conciliation, and negotiation to the commission. Inspector Gatica
again explains that Inspectors from the Maquila Commission are in the process of
training the other labor inspectors in mediation and negotiation so that cases can be
resolved faster and with less conflict. 1 79
176 Ibid.
177 Personal Communication, March 25, 2004.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 4: RETHINKING OUR MODELS FOR PROTECTING
WORKERS' RIGHTS
In examining the cases of Choishin, Cimatextiles, and Nobland in the previous
chapter, we saw that the unexpected has occurred in Guatemala's apparel-for-export
sector. The bodies of literature relating to improving labor conditions in the
developing worLd that I described in Chapter 2 (i.e. lobby government to enforce
labor laws, implement corporate codes of conduct and independent monitoring, and
organize cross-border union campaigns) seem individually inadequate to expLain the
occurrences in Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector. This chapter, therefore, will
explain what each of those explanations misses and propose a synthesized modeL for
protecting workers' rights.
Each of the aforementioned schools of thought wouLd explain the successes of the
Choishin, Cimatextiles, and Nobland unions according to their own theories. For
example, Neil Kearney, President of the ITGLWF, claims that it was the government
intervention in the Choishin case that was key: "one action by government in
enforcing its labor laws has had much more impact than ten years so-called 'voluntary
initiative'. There is surely a Lesson to be learned here."' 80
On another note, Liz Claiborne and Gap could attribute the achievement of these
unions to their commitment to abor rights, enforcement of their corporate code of
conduct, and independent monitoring of those standards. Finally, Mary Mejia from
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the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center believes that the strength of the international alliances
and coordination (i.e. a cross-border organizing campaign) was fundamental to the
formation of the unions and negotiation of the contracts. 8
However, each of these explanations misses the complexity that Led to the success of
these cases. In reality it was a dynamic interaction between all of these approaches
that allowed the Choishin, Cimatextiles, and Nobland unions to form and negotiate
the only collective bargaining agreements in Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector.
As Jenny Pasquarella, a human and labor rights advocate who has worked with
COVERCO and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights' Workers' Rights Program,
explained,
The Choishin and Cimatextiles case illustrates the diverse influences
required to improve conditions for workers producing apparel for a
global market. In this case, government action was a catalyst. But the
political motives of the government and the actual positive outcome
have a lot to do with the international actors and the free trade
architecture surrounding the case....
Choishin and Cimatextiles are not a typical maquila success story. They
are part of a small percentage of apparel factories in the global
economy where the multinational brand supplying from them has
implemented a human rights compliance program, an independent
external monitor has been brought in to document conditions, and where
worker organizing has been supported over the years by international
and local unions and NGOs. Without this involvement, Choi Shin and
Cimatextiles could easily have faded into the tapestry of closed-door
labor rights violators in Guatemala.18 2
The following section (4.1) will explain the limitations of each of the traditional
approaches. Then in section 4.2, I will propose a synthesized model for protecting
180 Kearney (2003).
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workers' rights in Guatemala's garment factories. Chapter 5 will then use the case of
Choishin to demonstrate the model and Chapter 6 will do the same for Nobland.
4.1: Evaluating the Existing Models
In this section, I will demonstrate why each approach to protecting workers' rights in
Guatemala alone is not enough to explain the successes at Choishin, Cimatextiles, and
Nobland.
Lobby Government
A brief digression to examine the forest sector can help us understand why traditional
efforts to lobby government are no longer effective. The forest sector is quite similar
to the apparel industry in that it has turned to environmental certification schemes to
fill the traditional government role of regulation and enforcement. In fact, Tim
Bartley, Professor of Sociology at Indiana University, has compared the certification
systems that have arisen for environmental standards in the forest sector and labor
standards in the apparel sector and explains why such remarkably similar systems of
non-governmental regulation have emerged.18 3
Since the 1980s, international trade regulations have made it increasingly difficult for
national governments to ensure that timber and forest products entering individual
nations were sustainably harvested. Bartley describes the watershed case of the early
1990s when the Austrian government attempted to ban the importation of tropical
timber that was not sustainably produced. Indonesia and Malaysia, countries that are
181 Personal Communication. February 2, 2004.
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highly reliant on tropical timber exports, threatened to challenge the aw as a non-
tariff barrier under GATT. Under significant pressure, the Austrian government
withdrew the law in 1993 and other governments were discouraged from regulating
tropical timber imports because they feared a similar challenge under global free
trade rules. The bottom line is that lobbying government to enforce environmental
and social regulations is no longer sufficient to ensure respect for environmental
standards or workers' rights.
Returning to the apparel sector in Guatemala, we can see how this approach alone
has not been sufficient. From 1986 to the present, various human rights groups and
unions have pressured the Guatemalan government to increase protections of labor
rights via petitions of Guatemala's US trade benefits under the General System of
Preferences. While the pressure applied to Guatemala by the US government
between 1992 and 1995 did bring about a few revisions of the Guatemalan labor code,
documented abor violations have continued (see section 2.2).184
And over the course of the past eighteen years, these pressures have only been
significant during very specific political windows. For example, the US government
ignored GSP petitions regarding Guatemala from 1986 to 1992 and then, in 1997,
removed Guatemala from five-year probationary status under GSP review despite
continuing labor violations. And the one window for change only occurred because of
the negotiation of an end to Guatemala's civil war. In sum, pressure and lobbying of
182 Pasquarella (2003).
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the Guatemalan government alone has not been demonstrated to increase respect for
labor rights.
Corporate Codes of Conduct
As for corporate codes of conduct and independent monitoring, while they don't seem
to inherently undermine unions in the way that some critics suggest, they are not
enough to ensure workers' rights by themselves. As Stephen Coates, Director of
US/LEAP explains, "we must never imply that voluntary private sector codes and
monitoring are a substitute for national enforcement of Labor aws."'85
Even in Guatemala, where COVERCO has been praised as a highly respected example
of truly independent and respectful abor standard verification, independent
monitoring of a corporate code of conduct could not stop major violations of workers'
basic human rights and their rights under Guatemalan aw. For example, despite
COVERCO's presence in the Choi/Cima factories, a female worker Lost her baby when
she miscarried on the factory floor when her Korean supervisor refused her permission
to leave and see a doctor.' 8 6
Furthermore, Dwight Justice of the ICFTU explains the organization's platform that
"codes should not be a substitute for collective bargaining and, that to be
meaningful, codes of Labor practice must have the effect of creating space for worker
183 Bartley (2003).
184 Frundt (1999), MINUGUA (2000 and 2003), and Varley (1998).
185 Coates (1998).
186 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004. Verified by
COVERCO in its First Public Report (1999).
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self-organization and collective bargaining."187 Codes of conduct promise the bare
minimum in terms of labor rights and, therefore, do not address all of the issues that
are of concern to workers. As Homero Fuentes of COVERCO explained,
Independent monitoring just verifies minimum compliance with laws or
codes. Unions are there to insist that conditions be better than just the
minimum. Therefore, the presence of monitors does not replace a
union. 18 8
However, as drafted, few corporate codes of conduct in the garment industry
recognize freedom of association or allow unions to collectively bargain.'89
Cross-Border Organizing
Finally, I would like to touch on a few imitations to the cross-border organizing
framework. First of all, this approach is very intensive, requiring a lot of time and
resources to organize in one factory at a time. As Stephen Coates of US/LEAP
explains, 'We don't have the capacity to wage thousands of campaigns and must take
on specific corporate campaigns with clear strategic goals in mind."1 90 And the
ultimate failure of the Phillips-Van Heusen case in Guatemala (see chapter 1) shows
the dangers of a model that requires such intense effort; in that case, after six years
of organizing finally brought a union victory, the corporation picked up and moved to
Honduras. Second, the model isolates organizing from enforcement of corporate
codes of conduct and does not acknowledge that union organizing can occur in
locations where corporate codes of conduct are being independently monitored.
187 Justice (2001).
188 Personal Communication with Homero Fuentes, Coordinator of COVERCO. January 27, 2004.
189 Jeffcott and Yanz (1999).
190 Coates (1998).
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Finally, the model is vague about how government is engaged and when/why it
reacts.
4.2: A New Model: The Big Squeeze
Esbenshade asserts that the best scenario for protecting workers' rights would be a
campaign that coordinated and reinforced the three strategies of combating
sweatshops: (1) government enforcement, (2) union organizing, and (3) corporate
campaigns.191 Other academics and activists have agreed that a more synthesized
approach is required. Jeffcott and Yanz of the Canadian-based NGO Maquila
Solidarity Network "believe voluntary codes and monitoring systems can potentially
be used to reinforce existing legislation and encourage governments to enforce that
legislation."' 92 Bama Athreya of the ILRF says that "codes of conduct have the
potential to play a critical role in the promotion of free trade unions...provided they
contain language protecting workers' rights to associate and form unions and to
bargain collectively." 193 Finally, Lance Compa describes the reality that "given
unions' weak presence in the global assembly line and the rapid-response capabilities
of many NGOs, codes of conduct are worthwhile. The challenge is to find the right
balance. "'94
The model for labor organizing that I observed in the Guatemalan apparel-for-export
sector seems to demonstrate the importance of this balance, not to mention both the
validity and the feasibility of Esbenshade's scenario (see Figure 4-2).
19' Esbenshade (2001).
192 Jeffcott and Yanz (1999).
93 As cited in Jeffcott and Yanz (1999).
79
Figure 4-2
The Big Squeeze
Model for Protecting Workers' Rights in Apparel-for-Export Factories
Through this synthesized approach, international allies and local organizers
concurrently apply pressure to (1) the local factory, (2) the national government and
the Ministry of Labor, and (3) the multinational buyer. This approach tries to create
both direct and indirect pressure from all directions on the local factory. The goal is
to gain respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining without allowing
the factory owners or multinational buyers to cut production and move to another
country. The multidimensional approach provides an organized ocal worker presence
194 Compa (2001).
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in the factory, but also focuses Local and international pressure through the MNC and
government to squeeze the local factory. In fact, it is the international allies' actions
that create openings for local workers' unions to pursue collective bargaining.
In this model, corporate codes of conduct are an important source of Leverage on the
MNCs, and independent monitoring is used to corroborate reports from workers,
unions, and their international allies and supply trustworthy information to the MNCs.
It also acknowledges specific Local business conditions that can provide leverage for
organizing campaigns.
This model corrects for several inconsistencies and missing aspects of Anner's
model,1 95 while at the same time combining it with schools of though on Lobbying
government and independent monitoring. This revised model gains its dynamism from
the fact that it includes the workers as active participants in the protection of their
rights; does not rely entirely on corporate codes of conduct and pressure on the Local
factory from the MNC; does not give up on the possibility that the government can
enforce local labor Laws; and acknowledges that independent monitoring, unions, and
government enforcement can be combined for positive results.
195 Several aspects of Anner's triangle of power model do not stand up to closer scrutiny; for example,
Anner describes three strategies for targeting the three points of the triangle, but while Transnational
Campaigns and Organizing (New Methods) are strategies for targeting the first and second points in the
triangle of power, Better Laws and Better Enforcement are not. Rather than being a means for
targeting the government, they are goals of an unnamed strategy. Furthermore, Anner maps
Transnational Campaigns as targeting only the MNCs; however, they also apply pressure to local
factories and government. Similarly, local Organizing campaigns do not only pressure the local factory,
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In conclusion, we have seen that each approach to improving working conditions is not
enough individually to explain how three unions formed and negotiated collective
bargaining agreements; to understand how independent monitoring and unions worked
together; or to appreciate how the Guatemalan government got involved in the cases.
However, the synthesized model proposed above can account for all of those
occurrences. The following chapter will use the Choi/Cima cases to demonstrate in
detail how each of these surprises can be best explained by this new model.
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but also engage with the MNC and the government. Finally, the model shows interaction between the
MNC and the local government of which there is little.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLANING THE VICTORY AT CHOI/CIMA
In the previous chapter, I proposed a synthesized model for protecting workers' rights
in apparel-for-export factories in the developing world. This chapter will use the
Choishin and Cimatextiles factories to demonstrate the descriptive value of this
model. I will describe the strategies utilized first by the local organizing campaign
and then by the unions' international allies to target the local factory, the
government, and the multinational corporation in turn. I will also touch on how the
work of the international allies lays the groundwork for the actions of the Local union
organizers. Finally, I will demonstrate how independent monitors also serve as a key
part of the model.
These factors are all significant in explaining how a series of strategies and
approaches worked together to create unexpected victories in Guatemala. Each
piece of this approach (see Figure 5-1 where I have filled in the details of these
particular cases) allowed respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining
without allowing the factory owners or multinational buyers to cut production and
leave the country. And as a result, there are two unionized sister factories in Villa
Nueva that maintained production and jobs for Guatemalans and saw some
improvement in working conditions.
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Figure 5-1
The Big Squeeze at Choishin and Cimatextiles
Model for Protecting Workers' Rights in Apparel-for-Export Factories
5.1: Local Organizing Campaign
Tactics for Local Factory
The primary building block of this approach to protecting workers' rights is the
independent trade union. The workers in a local factory are organized in this
structure in order to most effectively target the factory management. By organizing,
workers hope to achieve legal recognition of a union, legal protection from
management retaliation, and the right to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement
in order to improve their working conditions. The SITRACHOI/SITRACIMA union
84
CIO & FTGL W
0 -Campaigns
I
4%
4%
.%
I
I
SITRCIMA
& SITRACHOI
Uions
members explained to me that only with a union could they really present official
complaints against management to the Ministry of Labor, because individually they
were too scared of physical retaliation and firings and expected that management
would bribe inspectors and nothing would change.196
Although the unions were engaged in a significant amount of conflict with the factory
management, the ultimate goal of the organizing campaign was to move beyond
conflict, attain direct negotiation, and sign a collective bargaining agreement. As
Enrique Torres, legal counsel for FESTRAS (the union federation supporting the unions)
described, Guatemalan unions affiliated with their federation have
returned to the principle that a union only exists to negotiate. They are
not a conflict group, so conflict should only be used to get them to
negotiation. Negotiation is the only way to improve wages and working
conditions.... Using just conflict, they will break the company....A union
has to search for an equilibrium....They need to keep them productive
so they can negotiate. 1 9
As part of this approach, the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions used conflict to attain
direct negotiation, i.e. they filed innumerable legal complaints against the factory
management in the Ministry of Labor.198 As the unions detailed, a Labor Inspector
would come to the factory nearly everyday during the most confrontational period in
2001 and 2002 because the unions were submitting nearly daily complaints against the
196 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004. Personal
Communication with Laura Podolsky, organizer for STITCH. January 12, 2004.
197 Personal Communication with Edgar Torres, legal counsel for FESTRAS. February 2 2004.
198 This type of engagement is accounted for in Anner's triangle of power and documented most
specifically in Frundt (1999) when he explained the approach of clandestine leadership identification
and training, followed by rapid recruitment, in-plant agitation, and legal filings. However, as we move
into an examination of the tactics that the Choishin and Cimatextiles unions used to target the
government we are examining an area that is not covered by previous literature.
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factory management.1 99 However, as the following analysis will demonstrate, union
complaints against management were not enough to increase respect for union rights.
Tactics for Government
The approach to the local factory described above is dependent on the engagement of
the government, specifically the Labor Inspectorate. The Ministry of Labor must
certify the union and respond to workers' complaints against the factory
management. But historically, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor's response to worker
complaints and union petitions has been less than satisfactory (see Section 2.2).
My investigation of the Choi/Cima case uncovered that Guatemalan unions (at least
those associated with FESTRAS) have developed new tactics through which they
engage the Ministry of Labor in the more effective enforcement of existing labor Laws
and legal protection of workers' rights. Specifically, they have begun to denounce
the corrupt and unresponsive labor inspectors, as well as the factory management to
the Ministry of Labor.
In the Choi/Cima case, the unions denounced many inspectors before they got a
responsive one-Cesar Gatica. As a group, each union would stand up to the corrupt
inspectors and threaten a complaint at the national and international level.200 Cesar
Gatica confirmed that the unions' complaints against the previous inspectors, and the
failures of the inspectorate that they uncovered, were important in motivating the
199 Personal Communication with SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI unions. January 15, 2004.
200 Ibid.
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Ministry to designate a permanent inspector for the Choi/Cima factories. This official
decision proved indispensable for creating the dialogue that led to direct
negotiations.2 0'
Tactics for MNC
The third piece of the local organizing strategy is a direct relationship between the
union and the multinational producer. While both the cross-border organizing model
and corporate codes of conduct literature depict only international NGOs, consumers,
students, and unions interacting with the MNC, the Choi/Cima case demonstrates that
the interactions are more complex and happening on multiple levels simultaneously.
In fact, the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions have established direct relationships
with the multinational producer. As the in-country representative for Liz Claiborne,
Pinciri Fernando explained, "[LCI's relationship with the unions works] quite well. If
they had any issues, I used to get calls from they all the time. If they need me to be
present at any of the meetings, they always call. They call about rumors."202 This
interaction was important to the success of the campaign because it provided direct
pressure on the MNC from the workers.
In summary, at the local level, the unions tried to engage directly with factory
management, but also interacted with Liz Claiborne and the Ministry of Labor to
create other sources of pressure on the factory management.
201 Personal Communication. January 30, 2004.
202 Personal Communication Pinciri Fernando, in-country representative for LCI. January 13, 2004.
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5.2: International Allies
WhiLe the ocal unions carried out these actions, their international allies were
supporting them in a multitude of ways. In fact, the unions would not have achieved
the desired responses if their international allies had not set the stage with the Liz
Claiborne, the local factory, and the Guatemalan government.
Furthermore, the traditional explanation of the international allies' role in abor
agitation does not account for the dynamics that brought about the victories at
Choi/Cima. While previous accounts focus primarily on the international allies' role
in engaging with the MNC, the Choi/Cima case shows that they also engage indirectly
with the local factory and with government in very important ways.
Tactics for Local Factory
Anner's model of cross-border organizing does not document any direct interaction
between the transnational campaign and the Local factories. However, as I spoke
with the organizers of these campaigns, they explained that the pressure they
mobilized on the Korean president of Choi/Cima was an important part of the
organizing strategy. Specifically, David Morales, the Director of FESTRAS, explained
that FESTRAS, AFL-CIO, and US/LEAP coordinated with Korean, Japanese, and
Taiwanese unions to synchronize their protests and to pressure the Korean president
of Choi/Cima.203
203 Personal Communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. February 3, 2004.
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Tactics for Government
The actions of the international allies were important not only in pressuring Liz
Claiborne, but also in creating pressure on the Guatemalan government in the
international realm. Specifically, the coordinated consumer and student campaign in
the US created intense attention for the case. Laura Podolsky made clear that "the
Guatemalan government encountered this case wherever they went. When they
started talking about abor rights with the US government, IMF, ex-congressman
delegation, people brought up the case. It got a lot of coverage...it would seem the
government's interest in resolving it was growing because it continued to be present
on the international scene."204
This international attention proved significant for the Guatemalan government
because it was in the midst of negotiations for Central American Free Trade
Agreement. As Mary Mejia explained, "Guatemala was in a situation in which it had
to demonstrate that it was changing and respecting labor rights."205 In this context,
the unions' and international allies' complaint against Guatemala before the ILO
intensified the attention and criticism that the government was receiving at a key
moment.20 6 All of these coordinated pressures on the Guatemalan government ed
directly to collective bargaining negotiations in the Choi/Cima case. Laura Podolosky,
organizer for STITCH, summarizes the result of the coalescence of pressures:
The impetus for the negotiations came from the national level from
Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Economy wanting to resolve this
204 Personal Communication. January 12, 2004.
205 Personal Communication with Mary Mejia, organizer for the AFL-CIO and FESTRAS. February 2, 2004.
206 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. January 30, 2004.
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issue so they could get on with CAFTA negotiation and so that
Guatemala would have a decent enough and improving record of
addressing Labor rights issues and be a viable trading partner.
A congressman, Sandy Levin, came to Guatemala in March 2003 as part
of a delegation looking at the case and went back to the states and
spoke about it. I think that generated more pressure and awareness
again. And then there was a discussion between Neil Kearney and the
labor minister in Geneva. That was another push.
There were a series of pushes that coalesced around the governments
desire to negotiate free trade agreements. Also in the spring of last
year when Guatemala got decertified because they weren't doing
enough to stop drug trafficking. So that wasn't looking so good for
them. So they were ooking to score some image points and show that
they actually cared about Labor rights.207
Tactics for MNC
The actions taken by the unions' international allies are those same tactics described
by Anner and Frundt. US unions and NGOs, such as US/LEAP, took their complaints
directly to the brands, but these complaints were coordinated with student groups,
religious organizations, and consumer campaigns to create more force.20 8 Mary
Mejia, organizer for FESTRAS and ITGLWF, emphasized that "if a worker filed the
complaint directly, the brand never would have received it. But if an external group
like consumers submit it, that has more impact. Consumers have a lot of power to
pressure a company on labor rights."2 0 9 Because LCI is a high-end company whose
customer base tends to have a social conscience, this international coordination of
pressure on brands can bring about important actions from the brand.
207 Personal Communication. January 12, 2004.
208 Ibid.
209 Personal Communication. February 2, 2004.
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In summary, the unions' international allies tried to engage directly with Liz Claiborne
by threatening their reputation, but also created indirect pressures on the local
factory and the Guatemalan government in order to support the unions. These
pressures in turn created an opening in which the unions could act to gain
recognition, respect, and collective bargaining.
5.3: Independent Monitoring
Union organizers from Guatemala and their international allies expressed to me time
and time again that they did not believe that codes of conduct and independent
monitoring are the key to protecting workers' rights in garment factories. Rather,
they feel that the only viable option is the formation of unions through the cross-
border organizing approach described in Chapter 2. For example, David Morales told
me that in general he doesn't see that monitoring increases respect for workers'
rights and that "the only way to improve conditions in factories is union
organization."
However, I would like to demonstrate that this organizing approach, which depends
on the engagement of the multinational buyer (in this case Liz Claiborne), can
actually be aided by the existence of a code of conduct and the presence of an
independent monitoring group.
I intend to examine this proposal in the context of the campaign to engage Liz
Claiborne in the US. The letter that Liz Claiborne wrote to the workers promising to
respect freedom of association and continue production in the factory can be
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identified as a fundamental action that allowed the recognition and protection of
unions. While the coordinated consumer campaign was important to push Liz
Claiborne to this decision, I would argue that the consumer, student, union, and NGO
claims were reinforced in an essential way by the reports coming from the
independent monitoring organization, COVERCO.
According to Liz Claiborne, the reports that they received from COVERCO during that
time were fundamental to their decisions:
When we came to know there were unions in the factories, at that
moment we had a program with COVERCO, a monitoring program, three
years before the unions started. So that is one of the kev
factors....when we came to know there were unions, COVERCO was
present during all that time from beginning to end and they had a
chance to be in all meetings, all events, anything that happened in the
factory and let everyone know as an independent report. 21
Pinciri Fernando's emphasis that COVERCO's reporting was independent highlights the
fact that Liz Claiborne trusted COVERCO after three years of interaction in these
factories. Furthermore, Homero Fuentes and Dennis Smith of COVERCO explained
that "Liz Claiborne wouldn't have given us access to the factory at the time of the
conflict if we hadn't already demonstrated our capacity and independence."211 And it
seems that the reports that COVERCO issued regarding the violence in the factories
and the violations of worker's freedom of association provided reinforcement from a
trusted source of the reports that Liz Claiborne was receiving from the transnational
NGO campaign.
210 Personal Communication. January 13, 2004. (my emphasis)
211 Personal Communication. January 8, 2004.
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On a final note, it is important to explicitly highlight the fact that, although a
corporate code of conduct was in place and independent monitoring was being carried
out, the involvement of the Guatemalan government in enforcing its national labor
code was a key piece of the victory.
5.4: Recognizing the Points of Leverage
Finally, I would like to consider whether the organizing campaign's engagement with
the three points of the triangle of power and the presence of an independent monitor
are sufficient to explain the outcome of the Choi/Cima campaign.
I propose that the strategies and tactics of the organizing campaign were successful
because they took advantage of a specific business environment and leveraged
business conditions to gain respect for workers. Specifically, there were three
significant economic factors that created space and Leverage for the unions and their
allies. First, Liz Claiborne and Choi/Cima had a long term relationship in Guatemala
that had been in existence since 1992. Second, Cimatextiles was the only factory in
Guatemala at the time that offered Liz Caiborne a high skill and high quality
workforce. And finally, Choi/Cima had recently invested a considerable amount of
money in these factories and still had a long life Left on their national tax-exempt
status. In particular, these factors meant that it was not to Liz Claiborne's or
Choi/Cima's economic advantage to cut production and leave the factory when faced
with a union and a collective bargaining agreement. 21 2
212 Personal Communication with Alberto Choi, Administrative Manager of of Choi/Cima. January 23,
2004. Personal Communication with Pinciri Fernando, in-country representative for LCI. January 13,
2004.
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In conclusion, this chapter demonstrates how the synthesized model can be used to
explain the partial success at Choi/Cima. It shows how a series of strategies and
approaches worked together to allow the formation of a union, the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement, and respect for the Choi/Cima workers' rights. This
chapter reveals that the presence of the union was the essential building block of the
campaign and that the union used conflict sparingly and only as necessary to attain
collective bargaining negotiations. Furthermore it shows that the engagement of the
government was achieved through coordination national and international pressure
and was essential for the protection of the rights to freedom of association and
collective bargaining. Finally, it makes clear that the provision of trustworthy
information by an international monitor was essential to engaging the multinational
buyers and convincing them not to cut production and leave Guatemala.
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CHAPTER 6: EXPLAINING THE VICTORY AT NOBLAND
The SITRANB union and its international allies used the same approach as the
SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions in order to gain respect for the union and negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement. They applied the model as demonstrated in
Chapter 4 in order to create both direct and indirect pressure on the local factory
from all directions. However, in this case, victory was exponentially easier, in large
part because all of the actors, including the union federation, the international allies,
the local business community, the multinational buyers, and the government officials,
had learned from the first two unionization cases at Choi/Cima.
This chapter will demonstrate how the actors in the Nobland case used this
synthesized approach to gain victory, but will focus on how the model was refined in a
way that brought about a quicker and more definitive success. Specifically, this
chapter will demonstrate that the Nobland case was more successful because the
union was able in large part to avoid the conflict that ensued in the Choishin and
Cimatextiles cases. I will argue that there was less conflict because (1) the federation
and allies had learned significant lessons from the previous cases; (2) the target
actors had learned what to expect from the union and its allies and therefore
responded to the threat of the model; and (3) the workers at the Nobland factory had
an organizing background and a community behind them.
This section will not only explore how the campaign implemented the model, but also
how and why the target actors reacted to the threat of the model. In this vein, it will
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briefly consider how this model has changed the perceptions and responses of the
local business community, government, and MNCs to cross-border organizing actions.
6.1: Local Organizing Campaign
As in the Choishin and Cimatextiles cases, the multidimensional approach at NobLand
was strongly grounded in an organized local worker presence in the factory and a
clear goal of using conflict only as necessary to gain collective bargaining
negotiations.
Figure 6-1
The Big Squeeze at Nobland
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The tactics used in this campaign were also the same-denouncing the factory
management to the Ministry of Labor.213 But there were also some new aspects of
this campaign. First of all, the lessons that FESTRAS and the AFL-CIO Solidarity
Center had learned in terms of structuring their organizing team resulted in fewer
internal conflicts and a better run campaign. Most importantly, the organizing team
had more clearly defined roles and responsibilities and clearer lines of
communication. As Enrique Torres, legal council for FESTRAS, explained, "The
organizing team learned from the Choishin cases and the Nobland team was much
simpler and under the control of FESTRAS. FESTRAS didn't make the same mistake
with Nobland...there were fewer conflicts of power this way." And because of this
structure, with the Nobland campaign, the organizing team was able to "avoid a big
spectacle. They made mistakes with Choishin and Cimatextiles, but now have the
maturity and experience to inform and train the workers from NB."214
In this case less conflict was required to engage the local management and the
Ministry of Labor. The SITRANB union immediately requested that Cesar Gatica be
assigned as the dedicated inspector for the Nobland factory because they knew he
was trustworthy and experienced after his work on the Choi/Cima cases.2 5 According
to David Morales, director of FESTRAS, the request for Gatica demonstrates how "they
are trying to cover all the areas where they failed before. For example, they are
trying to involve the Ministry of Labor earlier in the process-unofficially and not per
213 Personal Communication with SITRANB Union. January 19, 2004. Personal Communication with Mary
Mejia, organizer for AFL-CIO and FESTRAS. February 3, 2004.
214 Personal Communication with David Morales, Director of FESTRAS. February 3, 2004.
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any law." 2 16 Once Inspector Gatica was assigned to this case, there were no
complaints against inspectors filed in the Labor Inspectorate for this case.2 '7
NonetheLess, the government knew what was possible and had the internationalized
conflict of the previous cases fresh in its mind; that is why the Ministry immediately
assigned Cesar Gatica to the case and tried to proactiveLy resolve the disputes. As
Inspector Gatica explained, 'We at the Ministry feet that we achieved a speedy and
preventative solution without returning to the giant conflict like in Choishin and
Cimatextiles."218 And Mary Mejia confirmed this when she said that "before the NB
union, the Ministry of Labor sent corrupt inspectors. When we formed the union, the
inspectors become more cautious and the Ministry sent Gatica."2 '9 General Inspector
Ceteste AyaLa explained the Ministry of Labor's new approach that applied in the
NobLand case, 'we don't want another conflict as big as was created by Cimatexties
and Choishin....We don't want more conflict. The idea is to preventativeLy take care
of complaints and mediate the cases were we can solve probLems before they are
magnified to something bigger than they really are."220
Finally, a major difference between the NobLand locaL organizing campaign and its
predecessors was the characteristics of the workers and the community in which they
lived and worked. Most of the workers in the NobLand factory lived and worked in the
215 Personal Communication with SITRANB Union. January 19, 2004. Personal Communication with Mary
Mejia, organizer for AFL-CIO and FESTRAS. February 3, 2004.
216 Personal Communication. February 3, 2004.
217 Personal Communication with Cesar Gatica, Labor Inspector. January 30, 2004.
218 Ibid.
219 Personal Communication. February 2, 2004.
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same community, had known each other for years, and therefore felt a sense of
solidarity. Many of the SITRANB union leaders had a background in organizing, be it
that their parents were union members, had previous leadership positions in gangs, or
had organized unofficial work stoppages and walkouts in the factory. Furthermore,
other workers were responsive to the organizing campaign because they trusted their
neighbors and "already had an idea of what fighting the management was about."221
In summary, at the local level, the SITRANB union engaged directly with factory
management, but also interacted with the Ministry of Labor to create other sources of
pressure on the factory management. The lessons learned by FESTRAS, the local
business community, and the Ministry of Labor from the earlier cases were significant
in that they allowed the union to form, gain official government recognition, and
request collective bargaining negotiations with significantly less conflict.
6.2: International Allies
As in the first two union campaigns, the work of the international allies aid the
groundwork for the actions of the local union organizers. The working group of
US/LEAP, AFL-CIO, and WRC engaged in direct negotiations with both the local factory
management and the multinational brands in order to create a window in which the
unions could act. These actors' primary responsibility was to engage in direct
conversations with the brands, particularly with the Gap, which has the most to lose
in terms of reputation and was therefore the most motivated to act. By approaching
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221 Personal Communication with Mary Mejia, organizer for AFL-CIO and FESTRAS. February 2, 2004.
Gap, the international allies knew that they were in essence sending a preventative
message to the Korean owner that he must keep these cases from escalating into a
huge conflict.2 22 But in this case, the international allies also arranged direct
meetings with the Nobland management and the Korean owner of the factory. In this
way, they could make sure that the management clearly understood the situation and
the potential for international action.
The strategies of the international allies also demonstrate that the threat of the
model is just as powerful, if not more powerful, than its actual use. For example, in
the Nobland case, the allies didn't launch a huge letter-writing campaign to mobilize
consumer power against the MNC; however, the threat that they could do so was
always in the background as they engaged the Gap, JCPenney, and Target in
conversations. As US/LEAP explained, "This campaign is very nuanced in terms of
the level of coordination. It reflects years of practice, trust-building, and
relationship building between actors (US/LEAP, AFL, WRC, FESTRAS, brands)."2 2 3
The international allies have established expectations of how they will act under
certain conditions, so the brands and the local business community have learned to
take their threats seriously. And this case seems to show that the threat of a long,
ugly conflict can make the business community take notice. For example, the Korean
president of Nobland was cognizant that a huge conflict in his factory could drag on
222 Personal Communication with US/LEAP organizer. March 19, 2004.
223 Ibid.
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for a long time and when asked why he accepted a collective bargaining agreement,
he explained that
if we didn't, we couldn't sell in the United Status. It's clear and
simple. Here in Guatemala, I'm paying more than in Thailand or the
Philippines. So then why do I produce here? Because it's so close to the
US. And because I'm not limited by quotas and I can produce as much
as I want. I don't come to Guatemala because the labor conditions are
worse than in the Philippines. It's all the same to me if I have to pay a
slightly higher minimum wage. I only want production that will maintain
my company...I prefer that these conflicts get solved rapidly by
improving some work conditions, so that we can continue production.
These same expectations and implicit threats were essential in engaging the
government in this case. Unlike in the Choishin and Cimatextiles cases, the
international allies did not bring international allegations against the Guatemalan
government. However, the potential risk of a huge internationalized conflict was
clearly on the minds of the government as they responded to the SITRANB union. As
Celeste Ayala, General Inspector in the Ministry of Labor acknowledged,
We don't want more problems like with Choishin and Cimatextiles.
That is what we want to avoid. We don't want more conflicts of that
magnitude. We give free technical assistance to employers and
workers. These are preventative functions. We don't want another
conflict as big as was created by Cimatextiles and Choishin....We don't
want more conflict. This is the idea. No more conflict. 2 25
In summary, the union's international allies tried to engage directly with the Gap and
the local management by threatening their production and their reputation, but also
created indirect pressures on the local factory and the Guatemalan government in
order to support the union. The pressures created by a threat of action and the
2 24 As reported by Changala, March 19, 2004.
225 Personal Communication. March 24, 2004.
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memory of the Choi/Cima conflict, in turn, produced an opening in which the union
could act to gain recognition, respect, and collective bargaining.
6.3: Independent Monitoring
In this case, corporate codes of conduct again proved to be an important source of
leverage on the MNCs. Independent monitoring was used to corroborate reports from
workers, union, and their international allies and supply trustworthy information to
the factory owner and multinational buyer.
Unlike at the Choishin and Cimatextiles factories, there was no long-term
independent monitoring in place at the Nobland factory at the time the union formed.
Despite this difference, independent verification was essentially used in the same way
in all three cases to independently show that the rights of the unions had been
violated by factory management at the time they formed and went public. Because
there was not an inspectorate team in place that had already earned the trust of all
the actors, the SITRANB union's international allies had to find one. They were able
to identify Changala, a former labor inspector with the UN's Verification Mission in
Guatemala, as an individual who was acceptable to the workers, management, and
brands alike. He was given complete access to the factory by management and was
approached by workers who considered him trustworthy.2 26
The use of independent verification also showed that the threat of a controversy with
the Choi/Cima case fresh in the mind of the business community was sufficient to
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bring the local factory management into compliance with the Guatemalan Labor code.
In fact, US/LEAP never had to share the report with the brands. Once the Korean
owner of Nobland saw that their violations had been verified and documented by
Changala, he agreed to collective negotiations. Therefore, it was not necessary to
forward the independent monitoring report onto the brands in order to create more
Leverage for the SITRANB union.2 7
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrates how the synthesized model can be used to
explain the victory at Nobland. It shows how a series of strategies and approaches
worked together to allow the formation of a union, the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement, and the respect for the Nobland workers' rights. While it
reinforces the Lessons Learned from the Choi/Cima case, it also shows why this case
was more successful. Specifically, the model was refined and the union was able to
use the threat of conflict that was remembered from the Choishin and Cimatextiles
cases to achieve negotiations. Most importantly, the federation and allies had
learned significant lessons from the previous cases; the target actors had learned
what to expect from the union and its allies and therefore responded to the threat of
the model; and the workers at the Nobland factory had an organizing background and
a community behind them. As a result, the Nobland workers attained negotiation
that allowed them to improve their conditions above those required by law.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
Given the realities of globalization and Guatemala's economic and institutional
context, one would not expect victories for labor rights in Guatemala. One would not
expect that the workers of Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector would be able to
organize themselves to protect their rights.
One would not expect that, given the ongoing and heated debate that pits union
organizing and corporate codes of conduct against each other as the best ways of
protecting labor rights, the two systems cannot coexist.
And one would not expect that, given its history of brutal repression of trade unions
and diminished state capacity after thirty-six years of civil war, the Guatemalan
government would be unable or unwilling to enforce the national labor code.
And yet, in the past three years, three unions have formed and negotiated collective
bargaining agreements in Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector.
In 2003, the SITRACHOI and SITRACIMA unions attained partial success. The unions
negotiated the only collective bargaining agreements in the Guatemalan garment
sector at the time. However, this should be considered a limited success, according
to my definition, because although they now have institutions in place to protect
workers' rights, they still have limited leverage vis-h-vis management to improve
their working conditions. They have limited leverage because the collective
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bargaining agreement was required by the government to improve their international
trade image and not because the union could demand it legally. However, the partial
victory thesis is supported anecdotally by improved working conditions in the
factories.
In the Nobland case, I witnessed a more complete success for protection of workers'
rights. The SITRANB union is powerful both in terms of numbers and bargaining
ability. It negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in record time and engaged
the government productively in the process. The workers attained negotiation that
allowed them to improve their conditions above those required by law, i.e. they
gained permission for time off to care for sick children, permission for medical leave,
fairer treatment, cleaner bathrooms, and onsite childcare.
This thesis has explored why these victories were possible and what series of factors
were responsible. It has also sought to explain the differences that are evident across
the cases. Based on my investigation of the Choishin, Cimatextiles, and Nobland
cases, none of the models for protecting workers' rights (i.e. lobbying government,
enforcing corporate codes of conduct, and organizing through cross-border alliances)
is sufficient to describe the dynamics at work in these victories. Rather, by isolating
their approaches, advocates for workers' rights have missed complexity and ignored
the ways that the individual models can work together.
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In reality it was a dynamic interaction between all of these approaches that allowed
the SITRACHOI, SITRACIMA, and SITRANB unions to form and negotiate the only
collective bargaining agreements in Guatemala's apparel-for-export sector. These
unions were successful because cross-border union organizing, corporate codes of
conduct, independent monitoring, and government enforcement were dynamically
combined. These cases were dynamic because they included the workers as active
participants in the protection of their rights; did not rely entirely on corporate codes
of conduct and pressure on the local factory from the MNC; did not give up on the
possibility that the government can enforce local labor laws; and acknowledged that
independent monitoring, unions, and government enforcement can be combined for
positive results.
First of all, the presence of the union was the essential building block of the
campaign and demonstrated respect for freedom of association. The unions used
conflict as necessary to attain collective bargaining negotiations and then held it in
reserve as a threat. Second, the engagement of the government was attained through
coordination of national and international pressure and was essential for the
protection of the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. This
engagement was accomplished by leveraging international trade pressures. Finally,
the provision of trustworthy information by an international monitor was essential to
engaging the multinational buyers and convincing them not to cut production and
leave Guatemala.
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With these explanations in mind, I have proposed a model that describes the
interaction between workers, organizers, independent monitors, government,
management, and multinational buyers. Through this synthesized approach,
international allies and local organizers concurrently apply pressure to the local
factory, the Ministry of Labor, the national government, and the MNC. This approach
tries to create both direct and indirect pressure on the local factory from all
directions to respect freedom of association and rights to collective bargaining
without allowing them to cut production and leave the country. The
multidimensional approach provides an organized local worker presence in the
factory, but also focuses local and international pressure through the MNC and
government to pressure the local factory. In fact, international allies create openings
for local workers' unions to pursue collective bargaining. In this model, corporate
codes of conduct are an important source of leverage on the MNCs, and independent
monitoring is used to corroborate reports from workers, unions, and their
international allies and supply trustworthy information to the MNCs.
This thesis also demonstrates how the new synthesized model accounts for differences
across the three cases. Most importantly it shows how the model changed
expectations of the campaign targets, i.e. the ocal factory, government and MNCs.
In other words, this research has shown how the local business community, the
government, and the MNCs have learned to act to avoid conflict because they saw
what a high conflict campaign could mean for their reputation.
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These cases provide a series of Lessons for protecting workers' rights. First of all,
transnational advocacy strategies are essential for opening spaces for local action.
Second, coordinated national and international pressures can motivate the national
government to get involved in labor rights. Third, independent verification by a
trusted source can be an important key for gaining respect from an MNC for a union.
Fourth, conflict should be used as a means of attaining collective bargaining and then
reserved as a threat for future campaigns.
But the most salient Lesson from Guatemala is that, under certain conditions, victory
for Labor rights is possible; it is possible to maintain garment sector employment
while increasing respect for workers' rights. And, if this sort of victory is possible in
Guatemala, then it seems possible anywhere.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS AND PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Individual Organizational Date of
Interviewed Affiliation Interview
Mary Bellman STITCH 8 Jan, 29 Jan
Homero Fuentes COVERCO 8 Jan, 9 Jan, 27 Jan
Rolando Figueroa VESTEX 12 Jan
Laura Podolsky STITCH 12 Jan
Pinciri Fernando Liz CLaiborne 13 Jan, 27 Jan (email)
Anonymous US/LEAP 14 Jan, 29 Jan,19 Mar
David Morales FESTRAS 14 Jan, 3 Feb
Workers Choi/Cima Unions 15 Jan, 20 Jan, 27 Apr(email)
Mary Mejia FESTRAS, AFL-CIO 15 Jan, 2 Feb
Lucky Bautista COVERCO 16 Jan
Workers NobLand Union 19 Jan
ALberto Choi Choi/Cima Factory 23 Jan
Enrique Torres FESTRAS 2 Feb
Cesar Gatica, Inspector Labor Ministry 30 Jan, 25 March
CeLeste Ayala, Gen Inspector Labor Ministry 24 March
Director General Labor Ministry 23 March
Ricardo ChangaLa MINUGUA 19 March
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